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Chapter 1
METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF COMPLEX
SYSTEMS SCIENCE: AN OVERVIEW
Cosma Rohilla Shalizi
Center for the Study of Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109
USA
cshalizi@umich.edu
Abstract In this chapter, I review the main methods and techniques of complex
systems science. As a first step, I distinguish among the broad patterns
which recur across complex systems, the topics complex systems science
commonly studies, the tools employed, and the foundational science of
complex systems. The focus of this chapter is overwhelmingly on the
third heading, that of tools. These in turn divide, roughly, into tools
for analyzing data, tools for constructing and evaluating models, and
tools for measuring complexity. I discuss the principles of statistical
learning and model selection; time series analysis; cellular automata;
agent-based models; the evaluation of complex-systems models; infor-
mation theory; and ways of measuring complexity. Throughout, I give
only rough outlines of techniques, so that readers, confronted with new
problems, will have a sense of which ones might be suitable, and which
ones definitely are not.
1. Introduction
A complex system, roughly speaking, is one with many parts, whose
behaviors are both highly variable and strongly dependent on the be-
havior of the other parts. Clearly, this includes a large fraction of the
universe! Nonetheless, it is not vacuously all-embracing: it excludes both
systems whose parts just cannot do very much, and those whose parts
are really independent of each other. “Complex systems science” is the
field whose ambition is to understand complex systems. Of course, this is
a broad endeavor, overlapping with many even larger, better-established
scientific fields. Having been asked by the editors to describe its meth-
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Figure 1.1. The quadrangle of complex systems. See text.
ods and techniques, I begin by explaining what I feel does not fall within
my charge, as indicated by Figure 1.1.
At the top of Figure 1.1 I have put “patterns”. By this I mean more or
less what people in software engineering do [1]: a pattern is a recurring
theme in the analysis of many different systems, a cross-systemic regu-
larity. For instance: bacterial chemotaxis can be thought of as a way of
resolving the tension between the exploitation of known resources, and
costly exploration for new, potentially more valuable, resources (Figure
1.2). This same tension is present in a vast range of adaptive systems.
Whether the exploration-exploitation trade-off arises among artificial
agents, human decision-makers or colonial organisms, many of the issues
are the same as in chemotaxis, and solutions and methods of investiga-
tion that apply in one case can profitably be tried in another [2, 3]. The
pattern “trade-off between exploitation and exploration” thus serves to
orient us to broad features of novel situations. There are many other
such patterns in complex systems science: “stability through hierarchi-
cally structured interactions” [4], “positive feedback leading to highly
skewed outcomes” [5], “local inhibition and long-rate activation create
spatial patterns” [6], and so forth.
At the bottom of the quadrangle is “foundations”, meaning attempts
to build a basic, mathematical science concerned with such topics as
the measurement of complexity [10], the nature of organization [11], the
relationship between physical processes and information and computa-
tion [12] and the origins of complexity in nature and its increase (or
decrease) over time. There is dispute whether such a science is possible,
if so whether it would be profitable. I think it is both possible and use-
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Figure 1.2. Bacterial chemotaxis. Should the bacterium (center) exploit the
currently-available patch of food, or explore, in hopes of finding richer patches else-
where (e.g. at right)? Many species solve this problem by performing a random walk
(jagged line), tumbling randomly every so often. The frequency of tumbling increases
when the concentration of nutrients is high, making the bacterium take long steps in
resource-poor regions, and persist in resource-rich ones [7–9].
ful, but most of what has been done in this area is very far from being
applicable to biomedical research. Accordingly, I shall pass it over, with
the exception of a brief discussion of some work on measuring complexity
and organization which is especially closely tied to data analysis.
“Topics” go in the left-hand corner. Here are what one might call
the “canonical complex systems”, the particular systems, natural, ar-
tificial and fictional, which complex systems science has traditionally
and habitually sought to understand. Here we find networks (Wuchty,
Ravasz and Baraba´si, this volume), turbulence [13], physio-chemical pat-
tern formation and biological morphogenesis [14, 15], genetic algorithms
[16, 17], evolutionary dynamics [18, 19], spin glasses [20, 21], neuronal
networks (see Part III, 4, this book), the immune system (see Part III,
5, this book), social insects, ant-like robotic systems, the evolution of
cooperation, evolutionary economics, etc.1 These topics all fall within
our initial definition of “complexity”, though whether they are studied
together because of deep connections, or because of historical accidents
and tradition, is a difficult question. In any event, this chapter will not
describe the facts and particular models relevant to these topics.
Instead, this chapter is about the right-hand corner, “tools”. Some are
procedures for analyzing data, some are for constructing and evaluating
models, and some are for measuring the complexity of data or models.
In this chapter I will restrict myself to methods which are generally
accepted as valid (if not always widely applied), and seem promising for
4biomedical research. These still demand a book, if not an encyclopedia,
rather than a mere chapter! Accordingly, I will merely try to convey the
essentials of the methods, with pointers to references for details. The
goal is for you to have a sense of which methods would be good things
to try on your problem, rather than to tell you everything you need to
know to implement them.
1.1 Outline of This Chapter
As mentioned above, the techniques of complex systems science can,
for our purposes, be divided into three parts: those for analyzing data
(perhaps without reference to a particular model), those for building
and understanding models (often without data), and those for measuring
complexity as such. This chapter will examine them in that order.
The first part, on data, opens with the general ideas of statistical
learning and data mining (§1.2), namely developments in statistics
and machine learning theory that extend statistical methods beyond
their traditional domain of low-dimensional, independent data. We then
turn to time series analysis (§1.3), where there are two important
streams of work, inspired by statistics and nonlinear dynamics.
The second part, on modeling, considers the most important and
distinctive classes of models in complex systems. On the vital area of
nonlinear dynamics, let the reader consult Socoloar (this volume).
Cellular automata (§1.4) allow us to represent spatial dynamics in a
way which is particularly suited to capturing strong local interactions,
spatial heterogeneity, and large-scale aggregate patterns. Complemen-
tary to cellular automata are agent-based models (§1.5), perhaps the
most distinctive and most famous kind of model in complex systems sci-
ence. A general section (1.6) on evaluating complex models, includ-
ing analytical methods, various sorts of simulation, and testing, closes
this part of the chapter.
The third part of the chapter considers ways of measuring complexity.
As a necessary preliminary, §1.7 introduces the concepts of information
theory, with some remarks on its application to biological systems.
Then §1.8 treats complexity measures, describing the main kinds
of complexity measure, their relationships, and their applicability to
empirical questions.
The chapter ends with a guide to further reading, organized by section.
These emphasize readable and thorough introductions and surveys over
more advanced or historically important contributions.
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2. Statistical Learning and Data-Mining
Complex systems, we said, are those with many strongly interdepen-
dent parts. Thanks to comparatively recent developments in statistics
and machine learning, it is now possible to infer reliable, predictive mod-
els from data, even when the data concern thousands of strongly depen-
dent variables. Such data mining is now a routine part of many indus-
tries, and is increasingly important in research. While not, of course, a
substitute for devising valid theoretical models, data mining can tell us
what kinds of patterns are in the data, and so guide our model-building.
2.1 Prediction and Model Selection
The basic goal of any kind of data mining is prediction: some vari-
ables, let us call them X, are our inputs. The output is another variable
or variables Y . We wish to use X to predict Y , or, more exactly, we
wish to build a machine which will do the prediction for us: we will put
in X at one end, and get a prediction for Y out at the other.2
“Prediction” here covers a lot of ground. If Y are simply other vari-
ables like X, we sometimes call the problem regression. If they are
X at another time, we have forecasting, or prediction in a strict sense
of the word. If Y indicates membership in some set of discrete cate-
gories, we have classification. Similarly, our predictions for Y can take
the form of distinct, particular values (point predictions), of ranges
or intervals we believe Y will fall into, or of entire probability distri-
butions for Y , i.e., guesses as to the conditional distribution Pr(Y |X).
One can get a point prediction from a distribution by finding its mean
or mode, so distribution predictions are in a sense more complete, but
they are also more computationally expensive to make, and harder to
make successfully.
Whatever kind of prediction problem we are attempting, and with
whatever kind of guesses we want our machine to make, we must be able
to say whether or not they are good guesses; in fact we must be able to
say just how much bad guesses cost us. That is, we need a loss function
for predictions3. We suppose that our machine has a number of knobs
and dials we can adjust, and we refer to these parameters, collectively,
as θ. The predictions we make, with inputs X and parameters θ, are
f(X, θ), and the loss from the error in these predictions, when the actual
outputs are Y , is L(Y, f(X, θ)). Given particular values y and x, we have
the empirical loss L(y, f(x, θ)), or Lˆ(θ) for short4.
Now, a natural impulse at this point is to twist the knobs to make
the loss small: that is, to select the θ which minimizes Lˆ(θ); let’s write
this θˆ = argminθ Lˆ(θ). This procedure is sometimes called empirical
6risk minimization, or ERM. (Of course, doing that minimization can
itself be a tricky nonlinear problem, but I will not cover optimization
methods here.) The problem with ERM is that the θˆ we get from this
data will almost surely not be the same as the one we’d get from the
next set of data. What we really care about, if we think it through, is
not the error on any particular set of data, but the error we can expect
on new data, E [L(θ)]. The former, Lˆ(θ), is called the training or in-
sample or empirical error; the latter, E [L(θ)], the generalization or
out-of-sample or true error. The difference between in-sample and
out-of-sample errors is due to sampling noise, the fact that our data
are not perfectly representative of the system we’re studying. There will
be quirks in our data which are just due to chance, but if we minimize
Lˆ blindly, if we try to reproduce every feature of the data, we will be
making a machine which reproduces the random quirks, which do not
generalize, along with the predictive features. Think of the empirical
error Lˆ(θ) as the generalization error, E [L(θ)], plus a sampling fluctu-
ation, ǫ. If we look at machines with low empirical errors, we will pick
out ones with low true errors, which is good, but we will also pick out
ones with large negative sampling fluctuations, which is not good. Even
if the sampling noise ǫ is very small, θˆ can be very different from θmin.
We have what optimization theory calls an ill-posed problem [22].
Having a higher-than-optimal generalization error because we paid
too much attention to our data is called over-fitting. Just as we are
often better off if we tactfully ignore our friends’ and neighbors’ little
faults, we want to ignore the unrepresentative blemishes of our sam-
ple. Much of the theory of data mining is about avoiding over-fitting.
Three of the commonest forms of tact it has developed are, in order of
sophistication, cross-validation, regularization (or penalties) and
capacity control.
2.1.1 Validation. We would never over-fit if we knew how
well our machine’s predictions would generalize to new data. Since our
data is never perfectly representative, we always have to estimate the
generalization performance. The empirical error provides one estimate,
but it’s biased towards saying that the machine will do well (since we
built it to do well on that data). If we had a second, independent set of
data, we could evaluate our machine’s predictions on it, and that would
give us an unbiased estimate of its generalization. One way to do this
is to take our original data and divide it, at random, into two parts,
the training set and the test set or validation set. We then use the
training set to fit the machine, and evaluate its performance on the test
set. (This is an instance of resampling our data, which is a useful trick
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in many contexts.) Because we’ve made sure the test set is independent
of the training set, we get an unbiased estimate of the out-of-sample
performance.
In cross-validation, we divide our data into random training and
test sets many different ways, fit a different machine for each training
set, and compare their performances on their test sets, taking the one
with the best test-set performance. This re-introduces some bias —
it could happen by chance that one test set reproduces the sampling
quirks of its training set, favoring the model fit to the latter. But cross-
validation generally reduces over-fitting, compared to simply minimizing
the empirical error; it makes more efficient use of the data, though it
cannot get rid of sampling noise altogether.
2.1.2 Regularization or Penalization. I said that the prob-
lem of minimizing the error is ill-posed, meaning that small changes in
the errors can lead to big changes in the optimal parameters. A standard
approach to ill-posed problems in optimization theory is called regular-
ization. Rather than trying to minimize Lˆ(θ) alone, we minimize
Lˆ(θ) + λd(θ) , (1.1)
where d(θ) is a regularizing or penalty function. Remember that
Lˆ(θ) = E [L(θ)] + ǫ, where ǫ is the sampling noise. If the penalty term
is well-designed, then the θ which minimizes
E [L(θ)] + ǫ+ λd(θ) (1.2)
will be close to the θ which minimizes E [L(θ)] — it will cancel out the
effects of favorable fluctuations. As we acquire more and more data, ǫ→
0, so λ, too, goes to zero at an appropriate pace, the penalized solution
will converge on the machine with the best possible generalization error.
How then should we design penalty functions? The more knobs and
dials there are on our machine, the more opportunities we have to get
into mischief by matching chance quirks in the data. If one machine
with fifty knobs, and another fits the data just as well but has only
a single knob, we should (the story goes) chose the latter — because
it’s less flexible, the fact that it does well is a good indication that
it will still do well in the future. There are thus many regularization
methods which add a penalty proportional to the number of knobs, or,
more formally, the number of parameters. These include the Akaike
information criterion or AIC [23] and the Bayesian information criterion
or BIC [24, 25]. Other methods penalized the “roughness” of a model,
i.e., some measure of how much the prediction shifts with a small change
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Figure 1.3. Empirical loss and generalization loss as a function of model complexity.
in either the input or the parameters [26, ch. 10]. A smooth function is
less flexible, and so has less ability to match meaningless wiggles in the
data. Another popular penalty method, the minimum description
length principle of Rissanen, will be dealt with in §1.8.3 below.
Usually, regularization methods are justified by the idea that models
can be more or less complex, and more complex ones are more liable to
over-fit, all else being equal, so penalty terms should reflect complexity
(Figure 1.3). There’s something to this idea, but the usual way of putting
it does not really work; see §1.2.3 below.
2.1.3 Capacity Control. Empirical risk minimization, we
said, is apt to over-fit because we do not know the generalization errors,
just the empirical errors. This would not be such a problem if we could
guarantee that the in-sample performance was close to the out-of-sample
performance. Even if the exact machine we got this way was not par-
ticularly close to the optimal machine, we’d then be guaranteed that
our predictions were nearly optimal. We do not even need to guarantee
that all the empirical errors are close to their true values, just that the
smallest empirical error is close to the smallest generalization error.
Recall that Lˆ(θ) = E [L(θ)] + ǫ. It is natural to assume that as
our sample size N becomes larger, our sampling error ǫ will approach
zero. (We will return to this assumption below.) Suppose we could find
a function η(N) to bound our sampling error, such that |ǫ| ≤ η(N).
Then we could guarantee that our choice of model was approximately
correct; if we wanted to be sure that our prediction errors were within
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ǫ of the best possible, we would merely need to have N(ǫ) = η−1(ǫ)
data-points.
It should not be surprising to learn that we cannot, generally, make
approximately correct guarantees. As the eminent forensic statistician
C. Chan remarked, “Improbable events permit themselves the luxury of
occurring” [27], and one of these indulgences could make the discrepancy
between Lˆ(θ) and E [L(θ)] very large. But if something like the law of
large numbers holds, or the ergodic theorem (§1.3.2), then for every
choice of θ,
Pr
(∣∣∣Lˆ(θ)−E [L(θ)]∣∣∣ > ǫ) → 0 , (1.3)
for every positive ǫ.5 We should be able to find some function δ such
that
Pr
(∣∣∣Lˆ(θ)−E [L(θ)]∣∣∣ > ǫ) ≤ δ(N, ǫ, θ) , (1.4)
with limN δ(N, ǫ, θ) = 0. Then, for any particular θ, we could give
probably approximately correct [28] guarantees, and say that, e.g.,
to have a 95% confidence that the true error is within 0.001 of the em-
pirical error requires at least 144,000 samples (or whatever the precise
numbers may be). If we can give probably approximately correct (PAC)
guarantees on the performance of one machine, we can give them for any
finite collection of machines. But if we have infinitely many possible ma-
chines, might not there always be some of them which are misbehaving?
Can we still give PAC guarantees when θ is continuous?
The answer to this question depends on how flexible the set of ma-
chines is — its capacity. We need to know how easy it is to find a θ
such that f(X, θ) will accommodate itself to any Y . This is measured
by a quantity called the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension [22]6. If
the VC dimension d of a class of machines is finite, one can make a PAC
guarantee which applies to all machines in the class simultaneously:
Pr
(
max
θ
∣∣∣Lˆ(θ)−E [L(θ)]∣∣∣ ≥ η(N, d, δ)) ≤ δ (1.5)
where the function η(N, d, δ) expresses the rate of convergence. It de-
pends on the particular kind of loss function involved. For example, for
binary classification, if the loss function is the fraction of inputs mis-
classified,
η(N, d, δ) =
1√
N
√(
d(1 + ln
2N
d
) + ln
4
δ
)
(1.6)
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Notice that θ is not an argument to η, and does not appear in (1.6). The
rate of convergence is the same across all machines; this kind of result is
thus called a uniform law of large numbers. The really remarkable
thing about (1.5) is that it holds no matter what the sampling distri-
bution is, so long as samples are independent; it is a distribution-free
result.
The VC bounds lead to a very nice learning scheme: simply apply
empirical risk minimization, for a fixed class of machines, and then give
a PAC guarantee that the one picked is, with high reliability, very close
to the actual optimal machine. The VC bounds also lead an appealing
penalization scheme, where the penalty is equal to our bound on the
over-fitting, η. Specifically, we set the λd(θ) term in (1.1) equal to the η
in (1.5), ensuring, with high probability, that the ǫ and λd(θ) terms in
(1.2) cancel each other. This is structural risk minimization (SRM).
It’s important to realize that the VC dimension is not the same as
the number of parameters. For some classes of functions, it is much
lower than the number of parameters, and for others it’s much higher.
(There are examples of one-parameter classes of functions with infinite
VC dimension.) Determining the VC dimension often involves subtle
combinatorial arguments, but many results are now available in the lit-
erature, and more are appearing all the time. There are even schemes
for experimentally estimating the VC dimension [29].
Two caveats are in order. First, because the VC bounds are distribution-
free, they are really about the rate of convergence under the worst pos-
sible distribution, the one a malicious Adversary out to foil our data
mining would choose. This means that in practice, convergence is of-
ten much faster than (1.5) would indicate. Second, the usual proofs of
the VC bounds all assume independent, identically-distributed samples,
though the relationship between X and Y can involve arbitrarily compli-
cated dependencies7. Recently, there has been much progress in proving
uniform laws of large numbers for dependent sequences of samples, and
structural risk minimization has been extended to what are called “mix-
ing” processes [30], in effect including an extra term in the eta function
appearing in (1.5) which discounts the number of observations by their
degree of mutual dependence.
2.2 Choice of Architecture
The basic idea of data mining is to fit a model to data with mini-
mal assumptions about what the correct model should be, or how the
variables in the data are related. (This differs from such classical sta-
tistical questions as testing specific hypotheses about specific models,
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such as the presence of interactions between certain variables.) This is
facilitated by the development of extremely flexible classes of models,
which are sometimes, misleadingly, called non-parametric; a better
name would be megaparametric. The idea behind megaparametric
models is that they should be capable of approximating any function, at
least any well-behaved function, to any desired accuracy, given enough
capacity.
The polynomials are a familiar example of a class of functions which
can perform such universal approximation. Given any smooth function
f , we can represent it by taking the Taylor series around our favorite
point x0. Truncating that series gives an approximation to f :
f(x) = f(x0) +
∞∑
k=1
(x− x0)k
k!
dkf
dxk
∣∣∣∣∣
x0
(1.7)
≈ f(x0) +
n∑
k=1
(x− x0)k
k!
dkf
dxk
∣∣∣∣∣
x0
(1.8)
=
n∑
k=0
ak
(x− x0)k
k!
(1.9)
In fact, if f is an nth order polynomial, the truncated series is exact, not
an approximation.
To see why this is not a reason to use only polynomial models, think
about what would happen if f(x) = sinx. We would need an infinite
order polynomial to completely represent f , and the generalization prop-
erties of finite-order approximations would generally be lousy: for one
thing, f is bounded between -1 and 1 everywhere, but any finite-order
polynomial will start to zoom off to ∞ or −∞ outside some range. Of
course, this f would be really easy to approximate as a superposition of
sines and cosines, which is another class of functions which is capable
of universal approximation (better known, perhaps, as Fourier analy-
sis). What one wants, naturally, is to chose a model class which gives a
good approximation of the function at hand, at low order. We want low
order functions, both because computational demands rise with model
order, and because higher order models are more prone to over-fitting
(VC dimension generally rises with model order).
To adequately describe all of the common model classes, or model
architectures, used in the data mining literature would require another
chapter. ([31] and [32] are good for this.) Instead, I will merely name a
few.
Splines are piecewise polynomials, good for regression on bounded
domains; there is a very elegant theory for their estimation [33].
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Neural networks or multilayer perceptrons have a devoted
following, both for regression and classification [32]. The appli-
cation of VC theory to them is quite well-advanced [34, 35], but
there are many other approaches, including ones based on statisti-
cal mechanics [36]. It is notoriously hard to understand why they
make the predictions they do.
Classification and regression trees (CART), introduced in the
book of that name [37], recursively sub-divide the input space,
rather like the game of “twenty questions” (“Is the temperature
above 20 centigrade? If so, is the glucose concentration above one
millimole?”, etc.); each question is a branch of the tree. All the
cases at the end of one branch of the tree are treated equivalently.
The resulting decision trees are easy to understand, and often sim-
ilar to human decision heuristics [38].
Kernel machines [22, 39] apply nonlinear transformations to the
input, mapping it to a much higher dimensional “feature space”,
where they apply linear prediction methods. The trick works be-
cause the VC dimension of linear methods is low, even in high-
dimensional spaces. Kernel methods come in many flavors, of
which the most popular, currently, are support vector machines
[40].
2.2.1 Predictive versus Causal Models. Predictive and de-
scriptive models both are not necessarily causal. PAC-type results give
us reliable prediction, assuming future data will come from the same dis-
tribution as the past. In a causal model, however, we want to know how
changes will propagate through the system. One difficulty is that these
relationships are one-way, whereas prediction is two-way (one can predict
genetic variants from metabolic rates, but one cannot change genes by
changing metabolism). The other is that it is hard (if not impossible) to
tell if the predictive relationships we have found are confounded by the
influence of other variables and other relationships we have neglected.
Despite these difficulties, the subject of causal inference from data is
currently a very active area of research, and many methods have been
proposed, generally under assumptions about the absence of feedback
[41–43]. When we have a causal or generative model, we can use very
well-established techniques to infer the values of the hidden or latent
variables in the model from the values of their observed effects [41, 44].
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2.3 Occam’s Razor and Complexity in
Prediction
Often, regularization methods are thought to be penalizing the com-
plexity of the model, and so implementing some version of Occam’s
Razor. Just as Occam said “entities are not to be multiplied beyond
necessity”8, we say “parameters should not be multiplied beyond neces-
sity”, or, “the model should be no rougher than necessary”. This takes
complexity to be a property of an individual model, and the hope is that
a simple model which can predict the training data will also be able
to predict new data. Now, under many circumstances, one can prove
that, as the size of the sample approaches infinity, regularization will
converge on the correct model, the one with the best generalization per-
formance [26]. But one can often prove exactly the same thing about
ERM without any regularization or penalization at all; this is what the
VC bounds (1.5) accomplish. While regularization methods often do well
in practice, so, too, does straight ERM. If we compare the performance
of regularization methods to straight empirical error minimization on ar-
tificial examples, where we can calculate the generalization performance
exactly, regularization conveys no clear advantage at all [45].
Contrast this with what happens in structural risk minimization.
There our complexity penalty depends solely on the VC dimension of
the class of models we’re using. A simple, inflexible model which we
find only because we’re looking at a complex, flexible class is penalized
just as much as the most wiggly member of that class. Experimentally,
SRM does work better than simple ERM, or than traditional penaliza-
tion methods.
A simple example may help illuminate why this is so. Suppose we’re
interested in binary classification, and we find a machine θ which cor-
rectly classifies a million independent data points. If the real error
rate (= generalization error) for θ was one in a hundred thousand, the
chance that it would correctly classify a million data points would be
(0.99999)10
6 ≈ 4.5 · 10−5. If θ was the very first parameter setting we
checked, we could be quite confident that its true error rate was much
less than 10−5, no matter how complicated the function f(X, θ) looked.
But if we’ve looked at ten million parameter settings before finding θ,
then the odds are quite good that, among the machines with an error
rate of 10−5, we’d find several which correctly classify all the points in
the training set, so the fact that θ does is not good evidence that it’s
the best machine9. What matters is not how much algebra is involved in
making the predictions once we’ve chosen θ, but how many alternatives
to θ we’ve tried out and rejected. The VC dimension lets us apply this
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kind of reasoning rigorously and without needing to know the details of
the process by which we generate and evaluate models.
The upshot is that the kind of complexity which matters for learning,
and so for Occam’s Razor, is the complexity of classes of models, not
of individual models nor of the system being modeled. It is important
to keep this point in mind when we try to measure the complexity of
systems (§1.8).
2.4 Relation of Complex Systems Science to
Statistics
Complex systems scientists often regard the field of statistics as irrel-
evant to understanding such systems. This is understandable, since the
exposure most scientists have to statistics (e.g., the “research methods”
courses traditional in the life and social sciences) typically deal with
systems with only a few variables and with explicit assumptions of inde-
pendence, or only very weak dependence. The kind of modern methods
we have just seen, amenable to large systems and strong dependence,
are rarely taught in such courses, or even mentioned. Considering the
shaky grasp many students have on even the basic principles of statisti-
cal inference, this is perhaps wise. Still, it leads to even quite eminent
researchers in complexity making disparaging remarks about statistics
(e.g., “statistical hypothesis testing, that substitute for thought”), while
actually re-inventing tools and concepts which have long been familiar
to statisticians.
For their part, many statisticians tend to overlook the very existence
of complex systems science as a separate discipline. One may hope that
the increasing interest from both fields on topics such as bioinformatics
and networks will lead to greater mutual appreciation.
3. Time Series Analysis
There are two main schools of time series analysis. The older one,
which has a long pedigree in applied statistics [46], and is prevalent
among statisticians, social scientists (especially econometricians) and
engineers. The younger school, developed essentially since the 1970s,
comes out of physics and nonlinear dynamics. The first views time series
as samples from a stochastic process, and applies a mixture of traditional
statistical tools and assumptions (linear regression, the properties of
Gaussian distributions) and the analysis of the Fourier spectrum. The
second school views time series as distorted or noisy measurements of
an underlying dynamical system, which it aims to reconstruct.
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The separation between the two schools is in part due to the fact
that, when statistical methods for time series analysis were first being
formalized, in the 1920s and 1930s, dynamical systems theory was lit-
erally just beginning. The real development of nonlinear dynamics into
a powerful discipline has mostly taken place since the 1960s, by which
point the statistical theory had acquired a research agenda with a lot
of momentum. In turn, many of the physicists involved in experimen-
tal nonlinear dynamics in the 1980s and early 1990s were fairly cavalier
about statistical issues, and some happily reported results which should
have been left in their file-drawers.
There are welcome signs, however, that the two streams of thought
are coalescing. Since the 1960s, statisticians have increasingly come to
realize the virtues of what they call “state-space models”, which are just
what the physicists have in mind with their dynamical systems. The
physicists, in turn, have become more sensitive to statistical issues, and
there is even now some cross-disciplinary work. In this section, I will try,
so far as possible, to use the state-space idea as a common framework
to present both sets of methods.
3.1 The State-Space Picture
A vector-valued function of time, xt, the state. In discrete time, this
evolves according to some map,
xt+1 ≡ F (xt, t, ǫt) (1.10)
where the map F is allowed to depend on time t and a sequence of
independent random variables ǫt. In continuous time, we do not specify
the evolution of the state directly, but rather the rates of change of the
components of the state,
dx
dt
≡ F (x, t, ǫt) (1.11)
Since our data are generally taken in discrete time, I will restrict myself
to considering that case from now on; almost everything carries over
to continuous time naturally. The evolution of x is so to speak, self-
contained, or more precisely Markovian: all the information needed to
determine the future is contained in the present state xt, and earlier
states are irrelevant. (This is basically how physicists define “state”
[47].) Indeed, it is often reasonable to assume that F is independent
of time, so that the dynamics are autonomous (in the terminology of
dynamics) or homogeneous (in that of statistics). If we could look at
the series of states, then, we would find it had many properties which
made it very convenient to analyze.
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Sadly, however, we do not observe the state x; what we observe or
measure is y, which is generally a noisy, nonlinear function of the state:
yt = h(xt, ηt), where ηt is measurement noise. Whether y, too, has
the convenient properties depends on h, and usually y is not convenient.
Matters are made more complicated by the fact that we do not, in typical
cases, know the observation function h, nor the state-dynamics F , nor
even, really, what space x lives in. The goal of time-series methods is to
make educated guess about all these things, so as to better predict and
understand the evolution of temporal data.
In the ideal case, simply from a knowledge of y, we would be able to
identify the state space, the dynamics, and the observation function. As
a matter of pure mathematical possibility, this can be done for essen-
tially arbitrary time-series [48, 49]. Nobody, however, knows how to do
this with complete generality in practice. Rather, one makes certain as-
sumptions about, say, the state space, which are strong enough that the
remaining details can be filled in using y. Then one checks the result for
accuracy and plausibility, i.e., for the kinds of errors which would result
from breaking those assumptions [50].
Subsequent parts of this section describe classes of such methods.
First, however, I describe some of the general properties of time series,
and general measurements which can be made upon them.
Notation. There is no completely uniform notation for time-series.
Since it will be convenient to refer to sequences of consecutive values.
I will write all the measurements starting at s and ending at t as yts.
Further, I will abbreviate the set of all measurements up to time t, yt−∞,
as y−t , and the future starting from t, y
∞
t+1, as y
+
t .
3.2 General Properties of Time Series
One of the most commonly assumed properties of a time-series is sta-
tionarity, which comes in two forms: strong or strict stationarity, and
weak, wide-sense or second-order stationarity. Strong stationarity is
the property that the probability distribution of sequences of observa-
tions does not change over time. That is,
Pr(Y t+ht ) = Pr(Y
t+τ+h
t+τ ) (1.12)
for all lengths of time h and all shifts forwards or backwards in time
τ . When a series is described as “stationary” without qualification, it
depends on context whether strong or weak stationarity is meant.
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Weak stationarity, on the other hand, is the property that the first
and second moments of the distribution do not change over time.
E [Yt] = E [Yt+τ ] (1.13)
E [YtYt+h] = E [Yt+τYt+τ+h] (1.14)
If Y is a Gaussian process, then the two senses of stationarity are equiv-
alent. Note that both sorts of stationarity are statements about the true
distribution, and so cannot be simply read off from measurements.
Strong stationarity implies a property called ergodicity, which is
much more generally applicable. Roughly speaking, a series is ergodic if
any sufficiently long sample is representative of the entire process. More
exactly, consider the time-average of a well-behaved function f of Y ,
〈f〉t2t1 ≡
1
t2 − t1
t=t2∑
t=t1
f(Yt) . (1.15)
This is generally a random quantity, since it depends on where the trajec-
tory started at t1, and any random motion which may have taken place
between then and t2. Its distribution generally depends on the precise
values of t1 and t2. The series Y is ergodic if almost all time-averages
converge eventually, i.e., if
lim
T→∞
〈f〉t+Tt = f¯ (1.16)
for some constant f¯ independent of the starting time t, the starting
point Yt, or the trajectory Y
∞
t . Ergodic theorems specify conditions
under which ergodicity holds; surprisingly, even completely deterministic
dynamical systems can be ergodic.
Ergodicity is such an important property because it means that sta-
tistical methods are very directly applicable. Simply by waiting long
enough, one can obtain an estimate of any desired property which will
be closely representative of the future of the process. Statistical infer-
ence is possible for non-ergodic processes, but it is considerably more
difficult, and often requires multiple time-series [51, 52].
One of the most basic means of studying a time series is to compute
the autocorrelation function (ACF), which measures the linear de-
pendence between the values of the series at different points in time.
This starts with the autocovariance function:
C(s, t) ≡ E [(ys −E [ys]) (yt −E [yt])] . (1.17)
(Statistical physicists, unlike anyone else, call this the “correlation func-
tion”.) The autocorrelation itself is the autocovariance, normalized by
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the variability of the series:
ρ(s, t) ≡ C(s, t)√
C(s, s)C(t, t)
(1.18)
ρ is ±1 when ys is a linear function of yt. Note that the definition is
symmetric, so ρ(s, t) = ρ(t, s). For stationary or weakly-stationary pro-
cesses, one can show that ρ depends only on the difference between τ t
and s. In this case one just writes ρ(τ), with one argument. ρ(0) = 1, al-
ways. The time tc such that ρ(tc) = 1/e is called the (auto)correlation
time of the series.
The correlation function is a time-domain property, since it is ba-
sically about the series considered as a sequence of values at distinct
times. There are also frequency-domain properties, which depend
on re-expressing the series as a sum of sines and cosines with definite
frequencies. A function of time y has a Fourier transform which is a
function of frequency, y˜.
y˜ ≡ Fy (1.19)
y˜ν =
T∑
t=1
e−i
2πνt
T yt , (1.20)
assuming the time series runs from t = 1 to t = T . (Rather than
separating out the sine and cosine terms, it is easier to use the complex-
number representation, via eiθ = cos θ + i sin θ.) The inverse Fourier
transform recovers the original function:
y = F−1y˜ (1.21)
yt =
1
T
T−1∑
ν=0
ei
2πνt
T y˜ν (1.22)
The Fourier transform is a linear operator, in the sense that F(x +
y) = Fx + Fy. Moreover, it represents series we are interested in as a
sum of trigonometric functions, which are themselves solutions to linear
differential equations. These facts lead to extremely powerful frequency-
domain techniques for studying linear systems. Of course, the Fourier
transform is always valid, whether the system concerned is linear or not,
and it may well be useful, though that is not guaranteed.
The squared absolute value of the Fourier transform, f(ν) = |y˜ν |2,
is called the spectral density or power spectrum. For stationary
processes, the power spectrum f(ν) is the Fourier transform of the auto-
covariance function C(τ) (a result called the Wiener-Khinchin theorem).
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An important consequence is that a Gaussian process is completely spec-
ified by its power spectrum. In particular, consider a sequence of inde-
pendent Gaussian variables, each with variance σ2. Because they are
perfectly uncorrelated, C(0) = σ2, and C(τ) = 0 for any τ 6= 0. The
Fourier transform of such a C(τ) is just f(ν) = σ2, independent of ν —
every frequency has just as much power. Because white light has equal
power in every color of the spectrum, such a process is called white
noise. Correlated processes, with uneven power spectra, are sometimes
called colored noise, and there is an elaborate terminology of red, pink,
brown, etc. noises [53, ch. 3].
The easiest way to estimate the power spectrum is simply to take
the Fourier transform of the time series, using, e.g., the fast Fourier
transform algorithm [54]. Equivalently, one might calculate the autoco-
variance and Fourier transform that. Either way, one has an estimate
of the spectrum which is called the periodogram. It is unbiased, in
that the expected value of the periodogram at a given frequency is the
true power at that frequency. Unfortunately, it is not consistent —
the variance around the true value does not shrink as the series grows.
The easiest way to overcome this is to apply any of several well-known
smoothing functions to the periodogram, a procedure called windowing
[55]. (Standard software packages will accomplish this automatically.)
The Fourier transform takes the original series and decomposes it
into a sum of sines and cosines. This is possible because any reasonable
function can be represented in this way. The trigonometric functions are
thus a basis for the space of functions. There are many other possible
bases, and one can equally well perform the same kind of decomposition
in any other basis. The trigonometric basis is particularly useful for
stationary time series because the basis functions are themselves evenly
spread over all times [56, ch. 2]. Other bases, localized in time, are more
convenient for non-stationary situations. The most well-known of these
alternate bases, currently, are wavelets [57], but there is, literally, no
counting the other possibilities.
3.3 The Traditional Statistical Approach
The traditional statistical approach to time series is to represent them
through linear models of the kind familiar from applied statistics.
The most basic kind of model is that of a moving average, which
is especially appropriate if x is highly correlated up to some lag, say q,
after which the ACF decays rapidly. The moving average model repre-
sents x as the result of smoothing q + 1 independent random variables.
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Specifically, the MA(q) model of a weakly stationary series is
yt = µ+wt +
q∑
k=1
θkwt−k (1.23)
where µ is the mean of y, the θi are constants and the wt are white noise
variables. q is called the order of the model. Note that there is no
direct dependence between successive values of y; they are all functions
of the white noise series w. Note also that yt and yt+q+1 are completely
independent; after q time-steps, the effects of what happened at time t
disappear.
Another basic model is that of an autoregressive process, where
the next value of y is a linear combination of the preceding values of y.
Specifically, an AR(p) model is
yt = α+
p∑
k=1
φkyt−k + wt (1.24)
where φi are constants and α = µ(1−
∑p
k=1 φk). The order of the model,
again is p. This is the multiple regression of applied statistics transposed
directly on to time series, and is surprisingly effective. Here, unlike the
moving average case, effects propagate indefinitely — changing yt can
affect all subsequent values of y. The remote past only becomes irrele-
vant if one controls for the last p values of the series. If the noise term
wt were absent, an AR(p) model would be a p
th order linear difference
equation, the solution to which would be some combination of exponen-
tial growth, exponential decay and harmonic oscillation. With noise,
they become oscillators under stochastic forcing [58].
The natural combination of the two types of model is the autore-
gressive moving average model, ARMA(p, q):
yt = α+
p∑
k=1
φkyt−k + wt +
q∑
k=1
θkwt−k (1.25)
This combines the oscillations of the AR models with the correlated
driving noise of the MA models. An AR(p) model is the same as an
ARMA(p, 0) model, and likewise an MA(q) model is an ARMA(0, q)
model.
It is convenient, at this point in our exposition, to introduce the notion
of the back-shift operator B,
Byt = yt−1 , (1.26)
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and the AR and MA polynomials,
φ(z) = 1−
p∑
k=1
φkz
k , (1.27)
θ(z) = 1 +
q∑
k=1
θkz
k , (1.28)
respectively. Then, formally speaking, in an ARMA process is
φ(B)yt = θ(B)wt . (1.29)
The advantage of doing this is that one can determine many properties
of an ARMA process by algebra on the polynomials. For instance, two
important properties we want a model to have are invertibility and
causality. We say that the model is invertible if the sequence of noise
variables wt can be determined uniquely from the observations yt; in this
case we can write it as an MA(∞) model. This is possible just when
θ(z) has no roots inside the unit circle. Similarly, we say the model is
causal if it can be written as an AR(∞) model, without reference to any
future values. When this is true, φ(z) also has no roots inside the unit
circle.
If we have a causal, invertible ARMA model, with known parameters,
we can work out the sequence of noise terms, or innovations wt asso-
ciated with our measured values yt. Then, if we want to forecast what
happens past the end of our series, we can simply extrapolate forward,
getting predictions yˆT+1, yˆT+2, etc. Conversely, if we knew the innova-
tion sequence, we could determine the parameters φ and θ. When both
are unknown, as is the case when we want to fit a model, we need to de-
termine them jointly [55]. In particular, a common procedure is to work
forward through the data, trying to predict the value at each time on the
basis of the past of the series; the sum of the squared differences between
these predicted values yˆt and the actual ones yt forms the empirical loss:
L =
T∑
i=1
(yt − yˆt)2 (1.30)
For this loss function, in particular, there are very fast standard al-
gorithms, and the estimates of φ and θ converge on their true values,
provided one has the right model order.
This leads naturally to the question of how one determines the order
of ARMA model to use, i.e., how one picks p and q. This is precisely
a model selection task, as discussed in §1.2. All methods described
there are potentially applicable; cross-validation and regularization are
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more commonly used than capacity control. Many software packages
will easily implement selection according to the AIC, for instance.
The power spectrum of an ARMA(p, q) process can be given in closed
form:
f(ν) =
σ2
2π
(1 +
∑q
k=1 θke
−iνk)
2
(1−∑pk=1 φke−iνk)2 . (1.31)
Thus, the parameters of an ARMA process can be estimated directly
from the power spectrum, if you have a reliable estimate of the spectrum.
Conversely, different hypotheses about the parameters can be checked
from spectral data.
All ARMA models are weakly stationary; to apply them to non-
stationary data one must transform the data so as to make it stationary.
A common transformation is differencing, i.e., applying operations of
the form
∇yt = yt − yt−1 , (1.32)
which tends to eliminate regular trends. In terms of the back-shift op-
erator,
∇yt = (1−B)yt , (1.33)
and higher-order differences are
∇dyt = (1−B)dyt . (1.34)
Having differenced the data to our satisfaction, say d times, we then fit
an ARMA model to it. The result is an autoregressive integrated
moving average model, ARIMA(p, d, q) [59], given by
φ(B)(1 −B)dyt = θ(B)wt , (1.35)
As mentioned above (§1.3.1), ARMA and ARIMA models can be re-
cast in state space terms, so that our y is a noisy measurement of a
hidden x [60]. For these models, both the dynamics and the observation
functions are linear, that is, xt+1 = Axt+ ǫt and yt = Bxt+ηt, for some
matrices A and B. The matrices can be determined from the θ and φ
parameters, though the relation is a bit too involved to give here.
3.3.1 Applicability of Linear Statistical Models. It is of-
ten possible to describe a nonlinear dynamical system through an effec-
tive linear statistical model, provided the nonlinearities are cooperative
enough to appear as noise [61]. It is an under-appreciated fact that this
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is at least sometimes true even of turbulent flows [62, 63]; the generality
of such an approach is not known. Certainly, if you care only about
predicting a time series, and not about its structure, it is always a good
idea to try a linear model first, even if you know that the real dynamics
are highly nonlinear.
3.3.2 Extensions. While standard linear models are more
flexible than one might think, they do have their limits, and recognition
of this has spurred work on many extensions and variants. Here I briefly
discuss a few of these.
Long Memory. The correlations of standard ARMA and ARIMA
models decay fairly rapidly, in general exponentially; ρ(t) ∝ e−t/τc ,
where τc is the correlation time. For some series, however, τc is effectively
infinite, and ρ(t) ∝ t−α for some exponent α. These are called long-
memory processes, because they remain substantially correlated over
very long times. These can still be accommodated within the ARIMA
framework, formally, by introducing the idea of fractional differencing,
or, in continuous time, fractional derivatives [64, 53]. Often long-memory
processes are self-similar, which can simplify their statistical estimation
[65].
Volatility. All ARMA and even ARIMA models assume constant
variance. If the variance is itself variable, it can be worthwhile to model
it. Autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH) models
assume a fixed mean value for yr, but a variance which is an auto-
regression on y2t . Generalized ARCH (GARCH) models expand the
regression to include the (unobserved) earlier variances. ARCH and
GARCH models are especially suitable for processes which display clus-
tered volatility, periods of extreme fluctuation separated by stretches
of comparative calm.
Nonlinear and Nonparametric Models. Nonlinear models are
obviously appealing, and when a particular parametric form of model
is available, reasonably straight-forward modifications of the linear ma-
chinery can be used to fit, evaluate and forecast the model [55, §4.9].
However, it is often impractical to settle on a good parametric form be-
forehand. In these cases, one must turn to nonparametric models, as
discussed in §1.2.2; neural networks are a particular favorite here [35].
The so-called kernel smoothing methods are also particularly well-
developed for time series, and often perform almost as well as parametric
models [66]. Finally, information theory provides universal prediction
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methods, which promise to asymptotically approach the best possible
prediction, starting from exactly no background knowledge. This power
is paid for by demanding a long initial training phase used to infer the
structure of the process, when predictions are much worse than many
other methods could deliver [67].
3.4 The Nonlinear Dynamics Approach
The younger approach to the analysis of time series comes from nonlin-
ear dynamics, and is intimately bound up with the state-space approach
described in §1.3.1 above. The idea is that the dynamics on the state
space can be determined directly from observations, at least if certain
conditions are met.
The central result here is the Takens Embedding Theorem [68]; a
simplified, slightly inaccurate version is as follows. Suppose the d-
dimensional state vector xt evolves according to an unknown but con-
tinuous and (crucially) deterministic dynamic. Suppose, too, that the
one-dimensional observable y is a smooth function of x, and “coupled”
to all the components of x. Now at any time we can look not just at
the present measurement y(t), but also at observations made at times
removed from us by multiples of some lag τ : yt−τ , yt−2τ , etc. If we use
k lags, we have a k-dimensional vector. One might expect that, as the
number of lags is increased, the motion in the lagged space will become
more and more predictable, and perhaps in the limit k →∞ would be-
come deterministic. In fact, the dynamics of the lagged vectors become
deterministic at a finite dimension; not only that, but the deterministic
dynamics are completely equivalent to those of the original state space!
(More exactly, they are related by a smooth, invertible change of coor-
dinates, or diffeomorphism.) The magic embedding dimension k is
at most 2d+ 1, and often less.
Given an appropriate reconstruction via embedding, one can investi-
gate many aspects of the dynamics. Because the reconstructed space is
related to the original state space by a smooth change of coordinates,
any geometric property which survives such treatment is the same for
both spaces. These include the dimension of the attractor, the Lyapunov
exponents (which measure the degree of sensitivity to initial conditions)
and certain qualitative properties of the autocorrelation function and
power spectrum (“correlation dimension”). Also preserved is the rela-
tion of “closeness” among trajectories — two trajectories which are close
in the state space will be close in the embedding space, and vice versa.
This leads to a popular and robust scheme for nonlinear prediction, the
method of analogs: when one wants to predict the next step of the
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series, take the current point in the embedding space, find a similar
one with a known successor, and predict that the current point will do
the analogous thing. Many refinements are possible, such as taking a
weighted average of nearest neighbors, or selecting an analog at random,
with a probability decreasing rapidly with distance. Alternately, one can
simply fit non-parametric predictors on the embedding space. (See [69]
for a review.) Closely related is the idea of noise reduction, using
the structure of the embedding-space to filter out some of the effects of
measurement noise. This can work even when the statistical character
of the noise is unknown (see [69] again).
Determining the number of lags, and the lag itself, is a problem of
model selection, just as in §1.2, and can be approached in that spirit.
An obvious approach is to minimize the in-sample forecasting error, as
with ARMA models; recent work along these lines [70, 71] uses the mini-
mum description length principle (described in §1.8.3.1 below) to control
over-fitting. A more common procedure for determining the embedding
dimension, however, is the false nearest neighbor method [72]. The
idea is that if the current embedding dimension k is sufficient to resolve
the dynamics, k+1 would be too, and the reconstructed state space will
not change very much. In particular, points which were close together in
the dimension-k embedding should remain close in the dimension-k + 1
embedding. Conversely, if the embedding dimension is too small, points
which are really far apart will be brought artificially close together (just
as projecting a sphere on to a disk brings together points on the oppo-
site side of a sphere). The particular algorithm of Kennel et al., which
has proved very practical, is to take each point in the k-dimensional em-
bedding, find its nearest neighbor in that embedding, and then calculate
the distance between them. One then calculates how much further apart
they would be if one used a k + 1-dimensional embedding. If this extra
distance is more than a certain fixed multiple of the original distance,
they are said to be “false nearest neighbors”. (Ratios of 2 to 15 are
common, but the precise value does not seem to matter very much.)
One then repeats the process at dimension k + 1, stopping when the
proportion of false nearest neighbors becomes zero, or at any rate suf-
ficiently small. Here, the loss function used to guide model selection is
the number of false nearest neighbors, and the standard prescriptions
amount to empirical risk minimization. One reason simple ERM works
well here is that the problem is intrinsically finite-dimensional (via the
Takens result).
Unfortunately, the data required for calculations of quantities like di-
mensions and exponents to be reliable can be quite voluminous. Approx-
imately 102+0.4D data-points are necessary to adequately reconstruct an
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attractor of dimension D [73, pp. 317–319]. (Even this is more op-
timistic than the widely-quoted, if apparently pessimistic, calculation
of [74], that attractor reconstruction with an embedding dimension of
k needs 42k data-points!) In the early days of the application of em-
bedding methods to experimental data, these limitations were not well
appreciated, leading to many calculations of low-dimensional determin-
istic chaos in EEG and EKG series, economic time series, etc., which did
not stand up to further scrutiny. This in turn brought some discredit
on the methods themselves, which was not really fair. More positively,
it also led to the development of ideas such as surrogate-data meth-
ods. Suppose you have found what seems like a good embedding, and
it appears that your series was produced by an underlying deterministic
attractor of dimension D. One way to test this hypothesis would be to
see what kind of results your embedding method would give if applied
to similar but non-deterministic data. Concretely, you find a stochastic
model with similar statistical properties (e.g., an ARMA model with the
same power spectrum), and simulate many time-series from this model.
You apply your embedding method to each of these surrogate data
series, getting the approximate distribution of apparent “attractor” di-
mensions when there really is no attractor. If the dimension measured
from the original data is not significantly different from what one would
expect under this null hypothesis, the evidence for an attractor (at least
from this source) is weak. To apply surrogate data tests well, one must
be very careful in constructing the null model, as it is easy to use over-
simple null models, biasing the test towards apparent determinism.
A few further cautions on embedding methods are in order. While
in principle any lag τ is suitable, in practice very long or very short
lags both lead to pathologies. A common practice is to set the lag
to the autocorrelation time (see above), or the first minimum of the
mutual information function (see §1.7 below), the notion being that this
most nearly achieves a genuinely “new” measurement [75]. There is
some evidence that the mutual information method works better [76].
Again, while in principle almost any smooth observation function will do,
given enough data, in practice some make it much easier to reconstruct
the dynamics; several indices of observability try to quantify this
[77]. Finally, it strictly applies only to deterministic observations of
deterministic systems. Embedding approaches are reasonably robust to
a degree of noise in the observations. They do not cope at all well,
however, to noise in the dynamics itself. To anthropomorphize a little,
when confronted by apparent non-determinism, they respond by adding
more dimensions, and so distinguishing apparently similar cases. Thus,
when confronted with data which really are stochastic, they will infer an
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infinite number of dimensions, which is correct in a way, but definitely
not helpful.
These remarks should not be taken to belittle the very real power
of nonlinear dynamics methods. Applied skillfully, they are powerful
tools for understanding the behavior of complex systems, especially for
probing aspects of their structure which are not directly accessible.
3.5 Filtering and State Estimation
Suppose we have a state-space model for our time series, and some
observations y, can we find the state x? This is the problem of filtering
or state estimation. Clearly, it is not the same as the problem of
finding a model in the first place, but it is closely related, and also a
problem in statistical inference.
In this context, a filter is a function which provides an estimate xˆt of
xt on the basis of observations up to and including
10 time t: xˆt = f(y
t
0).
A filter is recursive11 if it estimates the state at t on the basis of its
estimate at t − 1 and the new observation: xˆt = f(xˆt−1, yt). Recursive
filters are especially suited to on-line use, since one does not need to
retain the complete sequence of previous observations, merely the most
recent estimate of the state. As with prediction in general, filters can be
designed to provide either point estimates of the state, or distributional
estimates. Ideally, in the latter case, we would get the conditional dis-
tribution, Pr(Xt = x|Y t1 = yt1), and in the former case the conditional
expectation,
∫
x xPr(Xt = x|Y t1 = yt1)dx.
Given the frequency with which the problem of state estimation shows
up in different disciplines, and its general importance when it does ap-
pear, much thought has been devoted to it over many years. The problem
of optimal linear filters for stationary processes was solved independently
by two of the “grandfathers” of complex systems science, Norbert Wiener
and A. N. Kolmogorov, during the Second World War [78, 79]. In the
1960s, Kalman and Bucy [80–82] solved the problem of optimal recur-
sive filtering, assuming linear dynamics, linear observations and additive
noise. In the resulting Kalman filter, the new estimate of the state is
a weighted combination of the old state, extrapolated forward, and the
state which would be inferred from the new observation alone. The re-
quirement of linear dynamics can be relaxed slightly with what’s called
the “extended Kalman filter”, essentially by linearizing the dynamics
around the current estimated state.
Nonlinear solutions go back to pioneering work of Stratonovich [83]
and Kushner [84] in the later 1960s, who gave optimal, recursive solu-
tions. Unlike the Wiener or Kalman filters, which give point estimates,
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the Stratonovich-Kushner approach calculates the complete conditional
distribution of the state; point estimates take the form of the mean or
the most probable state [85]. In most circumstances, the strictly optimal
filter is hopelessly impractical numerically. Modern developments, how-
ever, have opened up some very important lines of approach to practical
nonlinear filters [86], including approaches which exploit the geometry
of the nonlinear dynamics [87, 88], as well as more mundane methods
which yield tractable numerical approximations to the optimal filters
[89, 90]. Noise reduction methods (§1.3.4) and hidden Markov models
(§1.3.6) can also be regarded as nonlinear filters.
3.6 Symbolic or Categorical Time Series
The methods we have considered so far are intended for time-series
taking continuous values. An alternative is to break the range of the
time-series into discrete categories (generally only finitely many of them);
these categories are sometimes called symbols, and the study of these
time-series symbolic dynamics. Modeling and prediction then reduces
to a (perhaps more tractable) problem in discrete probability, and many
methods can be used which are simply inapplicable to continuous-valued
series [10]. Of course, if a bad discretization is chosen, the results of
such methods are pretty well meaningless, but sometimes one gets data
which is already nicely discrete — human languages, the sequences of
bio-polymers, neuronal spike trains, etc. We shall return to the issue
of discretization below, but for the moment, we will simply consider
the applicable methods for discrete-valued, discrete-time series, however
obtained.
Formally, we take a continuous variable z and partition its range
into a number of discrete cells, each labeled by a different symbol from
some alphabet; the partition gives us a discrete variable y = φ(z). A
word or string is just a sequence of symbols, y0y1 . . . yn. A time series
zn0 naturally generates a string φ(z
n
0 ) ≡ φ(z0)φ(z1) . . . φ(zn). In general,
not every possible string can actually be generated by the dynamics of
the system we’re considering. The set of allowed sequences is called the
language. A sequence which is never generated is said to be forbidden.
In a slightly inconsistent metaphor, the rules which specify the allowed
words of a language are called its grammar. To each grammar there
corresponds an abstract machine or automaton which can determine
whether a given word belongs to the language, or, equivalently, generate
all and only the allowed words of the language. The generative versions
of these automata are stochastic, i.e., they generate different words with
different probabilities, matching the statistics of φ(z).
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By imposing restrictions on the forms the grammatical rules can take,
or, equivalently, on the memory available to the automaton, we can di-
vide all languages into four nested classes, a hierarchical classification
due to Chomsky [91]. At the bottom are the members of the weakest,
most restricted class, the regular languages generated by automata
within only a fixed, finite memory for past symbols (finite state ma-
chines). Above them are the context free languages, whose grammars
do not depend on context; the corresponding machines are stack au-
tomata, which can store an unlimited number of symbols in their mem-
ory, but on a strictly first-in, first-out basis. Then come the context-
sensitive languages; and at the very top, the unrestricted languages,
generated by universal computers. Each stage in the hierarchy can sim-
ulate all those beneath it.
We may seem to have departed very far from dynamics, but actually
this is not so. Because different languages classes are distinguished by
different kinds of memories, they have very different correlation prop-
erties (§1.3.2), mutual information functions (§1.7), and so forth — see
[10] for details. Moreover, it is often easier to determine these proper-
ties from a system’s grammar than from direct examination of sequence
statistics, especially since specialized techniques are available for gram-
matical inference [92, 93].
3.6.1 Hidden Markov Models. The most important special
case of this general picture is that of regular languages. These, we said,
are generated by machines with only a finite memory. More exactly,
there is a finite set of states x, with two properties:
1 The distribution of yt depends solely on xt, and
2 The distribution of xt+1 depends solely on xt.
That is, the x sequence is a Markov chain, and the observed y sequence
is noisy function of that chain. Such models are very familiar in signal
processing [94], bioinformatics [95] and elsewhere, under the name of
hidden Markov models (HMMs). They can be thought of as a gener-
alization of ordinary Markov chains to the state-space picture described
in §1.3.1. HMMs are particularly useful in filtering applications, since
very efficient algorithms exist for determining the most probable values
of x from the observed sequence y. The expectation-maximization
(EM) algorithm [96] even allows us to simultaneously infer the most
probable hidden states and the most probable parameters for the model.
3.6.2 Variable-Length Markov Models. The main limita-
tion of ordinary HMMs methods, even the EM algorithm, is that they
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assume a fixed architecture for the states, and a fixed relationship
between the states and the observations. That is to say, they are not
geared towards inferring the structure of the model. One could apply
the model-selection techniques of §1.2, but methods of direct inference
have also been developed. A popular one relies on variable-length
Markov models, also called context trees or probabilistic suffix
trees [97–100].
A suffix here is the string at the end of the y time series at a given
time, so e.g. the binary series abbabbabb has suffixes b, bb, abb, babb,
etc., but not bab. A suffix is a context if the future of the series is
independent of its past, given the suffix. Context-tree algorithms try
to identify contexts by iteratively considering longer and longer suffixes,
until they find one which seems to be a context. For instance, in a binary
series, such an algorithm would first try whether the suffices a and b are
contexts, i.e., whether the conditional distribution Pr(Yt+1|Yt = a) can
be distinguished from Pr(Yt+1|Yt = a, Y −t−1), and likewise for Yt = b. It
could happen that a is a context but b is not, in which case the algorithm
will try ab and bb, and so on. If one sets xt equal to the context at time
t, xt is a Markov chain. This is called a variable-length Markov model
because the contexts can be of different lengths.
Once a set of contexts has been found, they can be used for prediction.
Each context corresponds to a different distribution for one-step-ahead
predictions, and so one just needs to find the context of the current time
series. One could apply state-estimation techniques to find the context,
but an easier solution is to use the construction process of the contexts
to build a decision tree (§1.2.2), where the first level looks at Yt, the
second at Yt−1, and so forth.
Variable-length Markov models are conceptually simple, flexible, fast,
and frequently more accurate than other ways of approaching the sym-
bolic dynamics of experimental systems [101]. However, not every reg-
ular language can be represented by a finite number of contexts. This
weakness can be remedied by moving to a more powerful class of models,
discussed next.
3.6.3 Causal-State Models, Observable-Operator Models,
and Predictive-State Representations. In discussing the state-
space picture in §1.3.1 above, we saw that the state of a system is basi-
cally defined by specifying its future time-evolution, to the extent that
it can be specified. Viewed in this way, a state Xt corresponds to a dis-
tribution over future observables Y +t+1. One natural way of finding such
distributions is to look at the conditional distribution of the future obser-
vations, given the previous history, i.e., Pr(Y +t+1|Y −t = y−t ). For a given
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stochastic process or dynamical system, there will be a certain charac-
teristic family of such conditional distributions. One can then consider
the distribution-valued process generated by the original, observed pro-
cess. It turns out that the former has is always a Markov process, and
that the original process can be expressed as a function of this Markov
process plus noise. In fact, the distribution-valued process has all the
properties one would want of a state-space model of the observations.
The conditional distributions, then, can be treated as states.
This remarkable fact has lead to techniques for modeling discrete-
valued time series, all of which attempt to capture the conditional-
distribution states, and all of which are strictly more powerful than
VLMMs. There are at least three: the causal-state models or causal-
state machines (CSMs)12 introduced by Crutchfield and Young [102],
the observable operator models (OOMs) introduced by Jaeger [103],
and the predictive state representations (PSRs) introduced by Littman,
Sutton and Singh [104]. The simplest way of thinking of such objects is
that they are VLMMs where a context or state can contain more than
one suffix, adding expressive power and allowing them to give compact
representations of a wider range of processes. (See [105] for more on this
point, with examples.)
All three techniques — CSMs, OOMs and PSRs — are basically equiv-
alent, though they differ in their formalisms and their emphases. CSMs
focus on representing states as classes of histories with the same condi-
tional distributions, i.e., as suffixes sharing a single context. (They also
feature in the “statistical forecasting” approach to measuring complex-
ity, discussed in §1.8.3.2 below.) OOMs are named after the operators
which update the state; there is one such operator for each possible ob-
servation. PSRs, finally, emphasize the fact that one does not actually
need to know the probability of every possible string of future obser-
vations, but just a restricted sub-set of key trajectories, called “tests”.
In point of fact, all of them can be regarded as special cases of more
general prior constructions due to Salmon (“statistical relevance basis”)
[106, 107] and Knight (“measure-theoretic prediction process”) [48, 49],
which were themselves independent. (This area of the literature is more
than usually tangled.)
Efficient reconstruction algorithms or discovery procedures ex-
ist for building CSMs [105] and OOMs [103] directly from data. (There
is currently no such discovery procedure for PSRs, though there are
parameter-estimation algorithms [108].) These algorithms are reliable,
in the sense that, given enough data, the probability that they build the
wrong set of states becomes arbitrarily small. Experimentally, selecting
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an HMM architecture through cross-validation never does better than
reconstruction, and often much worse [105].
While these models are more powerful than VLMMs, there are still
many stochastic processes which cannot be represented in this form;
or, rather, their representation requires an infinite number of states
[109, 110]. This is mathematically unproblematic, though reconstruction
will then become much harder. (For technical reasons, it seems likely
to be easier to carry through for OOMs or PSRs than for CSMs.) In
fact, one can show that these techniques would work straight-forwardly
on continuous-valued, continuous-time processes, if only we knew the
necessary conditional distributions [48, 111]. Devising a reconstruction
algorithm suitable for this setting is an extremely challenging and com-
pletely unsolved problem; even parameter estimation is difficult, and
currently only possible under quite restrictive assumptions [112].
3.6.4 Generating Partitions. So far, everything has assumed
that we are either observing truly discrete quantities, or that we have a
fixed discretization of our continuous observations. In the latter case, it
is natural to wonder how much difference the discretization makes. The
answer, it turns out, is quite a lot; changing the partition can lead to
completely different symbolic dynamics [113–115]. How then might we
choose a good partition?
Nonlinear dynamics provides an answer, at least for deterministic
systems, in the idea of a generating partition [10, 116]. Suppose
we have a continuous state x and a deterministic map on the state
F , as in §1.3.1. Under a partitioning φ, each point x in the state
space will generate an infinite sequence of symbols, Φ(x), as follows:
φ(x), φ(F (x)), φ(F 2(x)), . . .. The partition φ is generating if each point
x corresponds to a unique symbol sequence, i.e., if Φ is invertible. Thus,
no information is lost in going from the continuous state to the discrete
symbol sequence13. While one must know the continuous map F to de-
termine exact generating partitions, there are reasonable algorithms for
approximating them from data, particularly in combination with em-
bedding methods [75, 117, 118]. When the underlying dynamics are
stochastic, however, the situation is much more complicated [119].
4. Cellular Automata
Cellular automata are one of the more popular and distinctive
classes of models of complex systems. Originally introduced by von Neu-
mann as a way of studying the possibility of mechanical self-reproduction,
they have established niches for themselves in foundational questions re-
lating physics to computation in statistical mechanics, fluid dynamics,
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and pattern formation. Within that last, perhaps the most relevant to
the present purpose, they have been extensively and successfully ap-
plied to physical and chemical pattern formation, and, somewhat more
speculatively, to biological development and to ecological dynamics. In-
teresting attempts to apply them to questions like the development of
cities and regional economies lie outside the scope of this chapter.
4.1 A Basic Explanation of CA
Take a board, and divide it up into squares, like a chess-board or
checker-board. These are the cells. Each cell has one of a finite number
of distinct colors — red and black, say, or (to be patriotic) red, white
and blue. (We do not allow continuous shading, and every cell has just
one color.) Now we come to the “automaton” part. Sitting somewhere
to one side of the board is a clock, and every time the clock ticks the
colors of the cells change. Each cell looks at the colors of the nearby cells,
and its own color, and then applies a definite rule, the transition rule,
specified in advance, to decide its color in the next clock-tick; and all the
cells change at the same time. (The rule can say “Stay the same.”) Each
cell is a sort of very stupid computer — in the jargon, a finite-state
automaton— and so the whole board is called a cellular automaton,
or CA. To run it, you color the cells in your favorite pattern, start the
clock, and stand back.
Let us follow this concrete picture with one more technical and ab-
stract. The cells do not have to be colored, of course; all that’s important
is that each cell is in one of a finite number of states at any given time.
By custom they’re written as the integers, starting from 0, but any “fi-
nite alphabet” will do. Usually the number of states is small, under
ten, but in principle any finite number is allowed. What counts as the
“nearby cells”, the neighborhood, varies from automaton to automa-
ton; sometimes just the four cells on the principle directions, sometimes
the corner cells, sometimes a block or diamond of larger size; in principle
any arbitrary shape. You do not need to stick to a chess-board; you can
use any regular pattern of cells which will fill the plane (or “tessellate”
it; an old name for cellular automata is tessellation structures). And
you do not have to stick to the plane; any number of dimensions is al-
lowed. There are various tricks for handling the edges of the space; the
one which has “all the advantages of theft over honest toil” is to assume
an infinite board.
Cellular Automata as Parallel Computers. CA are syn-
chronous massively parallel computers, with each cell being a finite
state transducer, taking input from its neighbors and making its own
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state available as output. From this perspective, the remarkable thing
about CA is that they are computationally universal, able to calculate
any (classically) computable function; one can use finite-state machines,
the least powerful kind of computer, to build devices equivalent to Tur-
ing machines, the most powerful kind of computer. The computational
power of different physically-motivated CA is an important topic in com-
plex systems [120, 121], though it must be confessed that CA with very
different computational powers can have very similar behavior in most
respects.
Cellular Automata as Discrete Field Theories. From the per-
spective of physics, a CA is a “digitized” classical field theory, in which
space, time and the field (state) are all discrete. Thus fluid mechan-
ics, continuum mechanics, and electromagnetism can all be simulated
by CA14 typically, however, the physical relevance of a CA comes not
from accurately simulating some field theory at the microscopic level,
but from the large-scale phenomena they generate.
Take, for example, simulating fluid mechanics, where CA are also
called lattice gases or lattice fluids. In the “HPP” [122] rule, a typi-
cal lattice gas with a square grid, there are four species of “fluid particle”,
which travel along the four principal directions. If two cells moving in
opposite directions try to occupy the same location at the same time,
they collide, and move off at right angles to their original axis (Figure
1.4). Each cell thus contains only an integer number of particles, and
only a discrete number of values of momentum are possible. If one takes
averages over reasonably large regions, however, then density and mo-
mentum approximately obey the equations of continuous fluid mechan-
ics. Numerical experiments show that this rule reproduces many fluid
phenomena, such as diffusion, sound, shock-waves, etc. However, with
this rule, the agreement with fluid mechanics is only approximate. In
particular, the square lattice makes the large-scale dynamics anisotropic,
which is unphysical. This in turn can be overcome in several ways — for
instance, by using a hexagonal lattice [123]. The principle here — get
the key parts of the small-scale “microphysics” right, and the interesting
“macrophysics” will take care of itself — is extensively applied in study-
ing pattern formation, including such biologically-relevant phenomena
as phase separation [124], excitable media [125], and the self-assembly
of micelles [126, 127].
5. Agent-Based Models
If there is any one technique associated with complex systems science,
it is agent-based modeling. An agent-based model is a computational
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Figure 1.4. Collisions in the HPP lattice gas rule. Horizontal collisions produce
vertically-moving particles (top) and vice versa (middle). Particles moving at right
angles pass by each other unchanged (bottom, omitting the reflections and rotations
of this figure).
model which represents individual agents and their collective behavior.
What, exactly, do we mean by “agent”? Stuart Kauffman has offered15
the following apt definition: “An agent is a thing which does things to
things”. That is, an agent is a persistent thing which has some state we
find worth representing, and which interacts with other agents, mutu-
ally modifying each others’ states. The components of an agent-based
model are a collection of agents and their states, the rules governing
the interactions of the agents, and the environment within which they
live. (The environment need not be represented in the model if its ef-
fects are constant.) The state of an agent can be arbitrarily simple, say
just position, or the color of a cell in a CA. (At this end, agent-based
models blend with traditional stochastic models.) States can also be ex-
tremely complicated, including, possibly, sophisticated internal models
of the agent’s world.
Here is an example to make this concrete. In epidemiology, there is
a classic kind of model of the spread of a disease through a population
called an “SIR” model [128, §4.4]. It has three classes of people — the
susceptible, who have yet to be exposed to the disease; the infected,
who have it and can pass it on; and the resistant or recovered, who have
survived the disease and cannot be re-infected. A traditional approach
to an SIR model would have three variables, namely the number of
people in each of the three categories, S(t), I(t), R(t), and would have
some deterministic or stochastic dynamics in terms of those variables.
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For instance, in a deterministic SIR model, one might have
S(t+ 1)− S(t) = −a
(
I(t)
S(t) + I(t) +R(t)
)
S(t) (1.36)
I(t+ 1) − I(t) =
[
a
S(t)
S(t) + I(t) +R(t)
− b− c
]
I(t) (1.37)
R(t+ 1)−R(t) = bI(t) (1.38)
which we could interpret by saying that (i) the probability of a suscepti-
ble person being infected is proportional to the fraction of the population
which is already infected, (ii) infected people get better at a rate b and
(iii) infected people die at a rate c. (This is not a particularly realistic
SIR model.) In a stochastic model, we would treat the right hand sides
of (1.36)–(1.38) as the mean changes in the three variables, with (say)
Poisson-distributed fluctuations, taking care that, e.g., the fluctuation
in the a IR+S+I term in (1.36) is the same as that in (1.37). The thing
to note is that, whether deterministic or stochastic, the whole model is
cast in terms of the aggregate quantities S, I and R, and those aggregate
variables are what we would represent computationally.
In an agent-based model of the same dynamics, we would represent
each individual in the population as a distinct agent, which could be
in one of three states, S, I and R. A simple interaction rule would be
that at each time-step, each agent selects another from the population
entirely at random. If a susceptible agent (i.e., one in state S) picks an
infectious agent (i.e., one in state I), it becomes infected with probability
a. Infectious agents die with probability b and recover with probability
c; recovered agents never change their state.
So far, we have merely reproduced the stochastic version of (1.36)–
(1.38), while using many more variables. The power of agent-based mod-
eling only reveals itself when we implement more interesting interaction
rules. For instance, it would be easy to assign each agent a position,
and make two agents more likely to interact if they are close. We could
add visible symptoms which are imperfectly associated with the disease,
and a tendency not to interact with symptomatic individuals. We could
make the degree of aversion to symptomatic agents part of the agents’
state. All of this is easy to implement in the model, even in combination,
but not easy to do in a more traditional, aggregated model. Sometimes
it would be all but impossible; an excellent case in point is the highly
sophisticated model of HIV epidemiology produced by Jacquez, Koop-
man, Simon and collaborators [129, 130], incorporating multiple routes
of transmission, highly non-random mixing of types, and time-varying
infectiousness.
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Agent-based models steer you towards representing individuals, their
behaviors and their interactions, rather than aggregates and their dy-
namics. Whether this is a good thing depends, of course, on what you
know, and what you hope to learn. If you know a lot about individuals,
agent-based models can help you leverage that knowledge into informa-
tion about collective dynamics. This is particularly helpful if the pop-
ulation is heterogeneous, since you can represent the different types of
individuals in the population by different states for agents. This requires
a bit of effort on your part, but often not nearly so much as it would
to represent the heterogeneity in an aggregated model. Conversely, if
you think you have the collective dynamics down, an ABM will let you
check whether a candidate for an individual-level mechanism really will
produce them. (But see §1.6, below.)
Ideally, there are no “mass nouns” in an ABM, nothing represented by
a smeared-out “how much”: everything should be represented by some
definite number of distinctly-located agents. At most, some aggregate
variables may be stuffed into the environment part of the model, but only
simple and homogeneous ones. Of course, the level of disaggregation at
which it is useful to call something an agent is a matter for particular
applications, and need not be the same for every agent in a model.
(E.g., one might want to model an entire organ as a single agent, while
another, more interesting organ is broken up into multiple interacting
agents, along anatomical or functional lines.) Sometimes it’s just not
practical to represent everything which we know is an individual thing
by its own agent: imagine trying to do chemical thermodynamics by
tracking the interactions of a mole of molecules. Such cases demand
either giving up on agent-based modeling (fortunately, the law of mass
action works pretty well in chemistry), or using fictitious agents that
represent substantial, but not too large, collections of individuals.
Models describing the collective dynamics of aggregate variables are
sometimes called “equation-based models”, in contrast to agent-based
models. This is sloppy, however: it is always possible, though gener-
ally tedious and unilluminating, to write down a set of equations which
describe the dynamics of an agent-based model. Rather than drawing
a false contrast between agents and equations, it would be better to
compare ABMs to “aggregate models”, “collective models” or perhaps
“factor models”.
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5.1 Computational Implementation: Agents are
Objects
The nicest way to computationally implement the commitment of dis-
tinctly representing each agent, is to make agents objects, which are,
to over-simplify slightly, data structures which have internal states, and
interact with each other by passing messages. While objects are not nec-
essary for agent-based models, they do make programming them much
easier, especially if the agents have much more state than, say, just a
position and a type. If you try to implement models with sophisticated
agents without using objects, the odds are good that you will find your-
self re-inventing well-known features of object-oriented programming.
(Historically, object-oriented programming began with languages for sim-
ulation modeling [131].) You might as well save your time, and do those
things right, by using objects in the first place.
Generally speaking, computational implementations of ABMs contain
many non-agent objects, engaged in various housekeeping tasks, or im-
plementing the functions agents are supposed to perform. For instance,
an agent, say a rat, might be supposed to memorize a sequence, say
of turns in a maze. One way of implementing this would be to use a
linked list, which is an object itself. Such objects do not represent actual
features of the model, and it should be possible to vary them without
interfering with the model’s behavior. Which objects are picked out as
agents is to some degree a matter of convenience and taste. It is common,
for instance, to have mobile agents interacting on a static environment.
If the environment is an object, modelers may or may not speak of it
as an “environment agent,” and little seems to hinge on whether or not
they do.
There are several programming environments designed to facilitate
agent-based modeling. Perhaps the best known of these is Swarm
(www.swarm.org), which works very flexibly with several languages, is
extensively documented, and has a large user community, though it
presently (2004) lacks an institutional home. RePast, while concep-
tually similar, is open-source (repast.sourceforge.net) and is asso-
ciated with the University of Chicago. StarLogo, and it successor,
NetLogo (ccl.sesp.northwestern.edu/netlogo), are extensions of
the popular Logo language to handle multiple interacting “turtles”, i.e.,
agents. Like Logo, children can learn to use them [132], but they are
fairly easy for adults, too, and certainly give a feel for working with
ABMs.
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5.2 Three Things Which Are Not Agent-Based
Models
Not everything which involves the word “agent” is connected to agent-
based modeling.
Representative agent models are not ABMs. In these models, the
response of a population to environment conditions is found by picking
out a single typical or representative agent, determining their behav-
ior, and assuming that everyone else does likewise. This is sometimes
reasonable, but it’s clearly diametrically opposed to what an ABM is
supposed to be.
Software agents are not ABMs. Software agents are a very useful
and rapidly developing technology [133, chapter 2]; an agent, here, is
roughly a piece of code which interacts with other software and with
pieces of the real world autonomously. Agents index the Web for search
engines, engage in automated trading, and help manage parts of the
North American electrical power grid, among other things. Some agent
software systems are inspired by ABMs [134]. When one wants to model
their behavior, an ABM is a natural tool (but not the only one by any
means: see [135]). But a set of software agents running the Michigan
power grid is not a model of anything, it’s doing something.
Finally, multi-agent systems [136] and rational agents [137] in
artificial intelligence are not ABMs. The interest of this work is in un-
derstanding, and especially designing, systems capable of sophisticated,
autonomous cognitive behavior; many people in this field would restrict
the word “agent” to apply only to things capable, in some sense, of
having “beliefs, desires and intentions”. While these are certainly com-
plex systems, they are not usually intended to be models of anything
else. One can, of course, press them into service as models [138], but
generally this will be no more than a heuristic device.
5.3 The Simplicity of Complex Systems Models
One striking feature of agent-based models, and indeed of complex
systems models in general, is how simple they are. Often, agents have
only a few possible states, and only a handful of kinds of interaction.
This practice has three motivations. (i) A model as detailed as the sys-
tem being studied would be as hard to understand as that system. (ii)
Many people working in complex systems science want to show that a
certain set of mechanisms are sufficient to generate some phenomenon,
like cooperation among unrelated organisms, or the formation of striped
patterns. Hence using simple models, which contain only those mech-
anisms, makes the case. (iii) Statistical physicists, in particular, have
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a long tradition of using highly simplified models as caricatures of real
systems.
All three motives are appropriate, in their place. (i) is completely un-
exceptionable; abstracting away from irrelevant detail is always worth-
while, so long as it really is irrelevant. (ii) is also fair enough, though
one should be careful that the mechanisms in one’s model can still gen-
erate the phenomenon when they interact with other effects as well.
(iii) works very nicely in statistical physics itself, where there are pow-
erful mathematical results relating to the renormalization group [139]
and bifurcation theory [14] which allow one to extract certain kinds of
quantitative results from simplified models which share certain qualita-
tive characteristics with real systems. (We have seen a related principle
when discussing cellular automata models above.) There is, however, lit-
tle reason to think that these universality results apply to most complex
systems, let alone ones with adaptive agents!
6. Evaluating Models of Complex Systems
We do not build models for their own sake; we want to see what they
do, and we want to compare what they do both to reality and to other
models. This kind of evaluation of models is a problem for all areas of
science, and as such little useful general advice can be given. However,
there are some issues which are peculiar to models of complex systems,
or especially acute for them, and I will try to provide some guidance
here, moving from figuring out just what your model does, to comparing
your model to data, to comparing it to other models.
6.1 Simulation
The most basic way to see what your model does is to run it; to do a
simulation. Even though a model is entirely a human construct, every
aspect of its behavior following logically from its premises and initial
conditions, the frailty of human nature is such that we generally cannot
perceive those consequences, not with any accuracy. If the model in-
volves a large number of components which interact strongly with each
other — if, that is to say, it’s a good model of a complex system — our
powers of deduction are generally overwhelmed by the mass of relevant,
interconnected detail. Computer simulation then comes to our aid, be-
cause computers have no trouble remembering large quantities of detail,
nor in following instructions.
6.1.1 Direct Simulation. Direct simulation — simply starting
the model and letting it go — has two main uses. One is to get a sense
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of the typical behavior, or of the range of behavior. The other, more
quantitative, use is to determine the distribution of important quan-
tities, including time series. If one randomizes initial conditions, and
collects data over multiple runs, one can estimate the distribution of de-
sired quantities with great accuracy. This is exploited in the time series
method of surrogate data (above), but the idea applies quite generally.
Individual simulation runs for models of complex systems can be rea-
sonably expensive in terms of time and computing power; large numbers
of runs, which are really needed to have confidence in the results, are
correspondingly more costly. Few things are more dispiriting than to
expend such quantities of time and care, only to end up with ambigu-
ous results. It is almost always worthwhile, therefore, to carefully think
through what you want to measure, and why, before running anything.
In particular, if you are trying to judge the merits of competing models,
effort put into figuring out how and where they are most different will
generally be well-rewarded. The theory of experimental design offers
extensive guidance on how to devise informative series of experiments,
both for model comparison and for other purposes, and by and large the
principles apply to simulations as well as to real experiments.
6.1.2 Monte Carlo Methods. Monte Carlo is the name
of a broad, slightly indistinct family for using random processes to es-
timate deterministic quantities, especially the properties of probability
distributions. A classic example will serve to illustrate the basic idea,
on which there are many, many refinements.
Consider the problem of determining the area A under an curve given
by a known but irregular function f(x). In principle, you could integrate
f to find this area, but suppose that numerical integration is infeasible
for some reason. (We will come back to this point presently.) A Monte
Carlo solution to this problem is as follows: pick points at random,
uniformly over the square. The probability p that a point falls in the
shaded region is equal to the fraction of the square occupied by the
shading: p = A/s2. If we pick n points independently, and x of them fall
in the shaded region, then x/n → p (by the law of large numbers), and
s2x/n→ A. s2x/n provides us with a stochastic estimate of the integral.
Moreover, this is a probably approximately correct (§1.2.1.3) estimate,
and we can expect, from basic probability theory, that the standard
deviation of the estimate around its true value will be proportional to
n−1/2, which is not bad16. However, when faced with such a claim, one
should always ask what the proportionality constant is, and whether it
is the best achievable. Here it is not: the equally simple, if less visual,
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scheme of just picking values of x uniformly and averaging the resulting
values of f(x) always has a smaller standard deviation [140, chapter 5].
This example, while time-honored and visually clear, does not show
Monte Carlo to its best advantage; there are few one-dimensional inte-
grals which cannot be done better by ordinary, non-stochastic numer-
ical methods. But numerical integration becomes computationally in-
tractable when the domain of integration has a large number of dimen-
sions, where “large” begins somewhere between four and ten. Monte
Carlo is much more indifferent to the dimensionality of the space: we
could replicate our example with a 999-dimensional hyper-surface in a
1000-dimensional space, and we’d still get estimates that converged like
n−1/2, so achieving an accuracy of ±ǫ will require evaluating the function
f only O(ǫ−2) times.
Our example was artificially simple in another way, in that we used
a uniform distribution over the entire space. Often, what we want is
to compute the expectation of some function f(x) with a non-uniform
probability p(x). This is just an integral,
∫
f(x)p(x)dx, so we could
sample points uniformly and compute f(x)p(x) for each one. But if some
points have very low probability, so they only make a small contribution
to the integral, spending time evaluating the function there is a bit of
a waste. A better strategy would be to pick points according to the
actual probability distribution. This can sometimes be done directly,
especially if p(x) is of a particularly nice form. A very general and
clever indirect scheme is as follows [141]. We want a whole sequence of
points, x1, x2, . . . xn. We pick the first one however we like, and after
that we pick successive points according to some Markov chain: that
is, the distribution of xi+1 depends only on xi, according to some fixed
function q(xi, xi+1). Under some mild conditions
17, the distribution of
xt approaches a stationary distribution q
∗(x) at large times t. If we could
ensure that q∗(x) = p(x), we know that the Markov chain was converging
to our distribution, and then, by the ergodic theorem, averaging f(x)
along a trajectory would give the expected value of f(x). One way to
ensure this is to use the “detailed balance” condition of the invariant
distribution, that the total probability of going from x to y must equal
the total probability of going the other way:
p(x)q(x, y) = p(y)q(y, x) (1.39)
q(x, y)
q(y, x)
=
p(y)
p(x)
≡ h(x, y) (1.40)
So now we just need to make sure that (1.40) is satisfied. One way
to do this is to set q(x, y) = min (1, h(x, y)); this was the original pro-
posal of Metropolis et al. Another is q(x, y) = h(x,y)1+h(x,y) . This method
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is what physicists usually mean by “Monte Carlo”, but statisticians call
it Markov chain Monte Carlo, or “MCMC”. While we can now es-
timate the properties of basically arbitrary distributions, we no longer
have independent samples, so evaluating the accuracy of our estimates
is no longer a matter of trivial probability18. An immense range of re-
finements have been developed over the last fifty years, addressing these
and other points; see the further reading section for details.
Keep in mind that Monte Carlo is a stochastic simulation method only
in a special sense — it simulates the probability distribution p(x), not the
mechanism which generated that distribution. The dynamics of Markov
chain Monte Carlo, in particular, often bear no resemblance whatsoever
to those of the real system19. Since the point of Monte Carlo is to tell
us about the properties of p(x) (what is the expectation value of this
function? what is the probability of configurations with this property?
etc.), the actual trajectory of the Markov chain is of no interest. This
point sometimes confuses those more used to direct simulation methods.
6.2 Analytical Techniques
Naturally enough, analytical techniques are not among the tools which
first come to mind for dealing with complex systems; in fact, they often
do not come to mind at all. This is unfortunate, because a lot of intel-
ligence has been devoted to devising approximate analytical techniques
for classes of models which include many of those commonly used for
complex systems. A general advantage of analytical techniques is that
they are often fairly insensitive to many details of the model. Since any
model we construct of a complex system is almost certainly much sim-
pler than the system itself, a great many of its details are just wrong. If
we can extract non-trivial results which are insensitive to those details,
we have less reason to worry about this.
One particularly useful, yet neglected, body of approximate analytical
techniques relies on the fact that many complex systems models are
Markovian. In an agent-based model, for instance, the next state of an
agent generally depends only on its present state, and the present states
of the agents it interacts with. If there is a fixed interaction graph,
the agents form a Markov random field on that graph. There are now
very powerful and computationally efficient methods for evaluating many
properties of Markov chains [58, 142], Markov random fields [143], and
(closely related) graphical models [144] without simulation. The recent
books of Peyton Young [145] and Sutton [146] provide nice instances
of using analytical results about Markov processes to solve models of
complex social systems, without impractical numerical experiments.
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6.3 Comparisons with Data
6.3.1 General issues. We can only compare particular aspects
of a model of a system to particular kinds of data about that system.
The most any experimental test can tell us, therefore, is how similar the
model is to the system in that respect. One may think of an experimental
comparison as a test for a particular kind of error, one of the infinite
number of mistakes which we could make in building a model. A good
test is one which is very likely to alert us to an error, if we have made
it, but not otherwise [50].
These ought to be things every school-child knows about testing hy-
potheses. It is very easy, however, to blithely ignore these truisms when
confronted with, on the one hand, a system with many strongly inter-
dependent parts, and, on the other hand, a model which tries to mirror
that complexity. We must decide which features of the model ought to
be similar to the system, and how similar. It is important not only that
our model be able to adequately reproduce those phenomena, but that it
not entail badly distorted or non-existent phenomena in other respects.
6.3.2 Two Stories and Some Morals. Let me give two
examples from very early in the study of complex systems, which nicely
illustrate some fundamental points.
The first has to do with pattern formation in chemical oscillators [147].
Certain mixtures of chemicals in aqueous solution, mostly famously the
Belusov-Zhabotinsky reagent, can not only undergo cyclic chemical re-
actions, but will form rotating spiral waves, starting from an initial fea-
tureless state. This is a visually compelling example of self-organization,
and much effort has been devoted to understanding it. One of the more
popular early models was the “Brusselator” advanced by Prigogine and
his colleagues at the Free University of Brussels; many similarly-named
variants developed. Brusselator-type models correctly predicted that
these media would support spiral waves. They all, further, predicted
that the spirals would form only when the homogeneous configuration
was unstable, and that then they would form spontaneously. It proved
very easy, however, to prepare the Belusov-Zhabotisnky reagent in such
a way that it was “perfectly stable in its uniform quiescence”, yet still
able to produce spiral waves if excited (e.g., by being touched with a
hot wire) [148]. The Brusselator and its variants were simply unable
to accommodate these phenomena, and had to be discarded in favor of
other models. The fact that these were qualitative results, rather than
quantitative ones, if anything made it more imperative to get rid of the
Brusselator.
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The second story concerns the work of Varela and Maturana on “au-
topoesis”. In a famous paper [149], they claimed to exhibit a computa-
tional model of a simple artificial chemistry where membranes not only
formed spontaneously, but a kind of metabolism self-organized to sus-
tain the membranes. This work influenced not just complex systems
science but theoretical biology, psychology, and even sociology [150].
When, in the 1990s, McMullin made the first serious effort to reproduce
the results, based on the description of the model in the paper, that
description proved not to match the published simulation results. The
discrepancy was only resolved by the fortuitous rediscovery of a mass
of papers, including Fortran code, that Varela had left behind in Chile
when forced into exile by the fascist regime. These revealed a crucial
change in one particular reaction made all the difference between suc-
cessful autopoesis and its absence. (For the full story, see [151, 152].)
Many similar stories could be told of other models in complex systems
[153]; this one is distinguished by McMullin’s unusual tenacity in trying
to replicate the results, Varela’s admirable willingness to assist him, and
the happy ending.
The story of autopoesis is especially rich in morals. (1) Replication is
essential. (2) It is a good idea to share not just data but programs. (3)
Always test the robustness of your model to changes in its parameters.
(This is fairly common.) (4) Always test your model for robustness to
small changes in qualitative assumptions. If your model calls for a given
effect, there are usually several mechanisms which could accomplish it.
If it does not matter which mechanism you actually use, the result is that
much more robust. Conversely, if it does matter, the over-all adequacy of
the model can be tested by checking whether that mechanism is actually
present in the system. Altogether too few people perform such tests.
6.3.3 Comparing Macro-data and Micro-models. Data
are often available only about large aggregates, while models, especially
agent-based models, are about individual behavior. One way of compar-
ing such models to data is to compute the necessary aggregates, from
direct simulation, Monte Carlo, etc. The problem is that many different
models can give the same aggregated behavior, so this does not provide
a powerful test between different models. Ideally, we’d work back from
aggregate data to individual behaviors, which is known, somewhat con-
fusingly, as ecological inference. In general, the ecological inference
problem itself does not have a unique solution. But the aggregate data,
if used intelligently, can often put fairly tight constraints on the indi-
vidual behaviors, and micro-scale can be directly checked against those
constraints. Much of the work here has been done by social scientists, es-
46
pecially American political scientists concerned with issues arising from
the Voting Rights Act [154], but the methods they have developed are
very general, and could profitably be applied to agent-based models in
the biological sciences, though, to my knowledge, they have yet to be.
6.4 Comparison to Other Models
Are there other ways of generating the data? There generally are,
at least if “the data” are some very gross, highly-summarized pattern.
This makes it important to look for differential signatures, places where
discrepancies between different generative mechanisms give one some
leverage. Given two mechanisms which can both account for our phe-
nomenon, we should look for some other quantity whose behavior will
be different under the two hypotheses. Ideally, in fact, we would look for
the statistic on which the two kinds of model are most divergent. The lit-
erature on experimental design is relevant here again, since it considers
such problems under the heading of model discrimination, seeking
to maximize the power of experiments (or simulations) to distinguish
between different classes of models [155, 156].
Perhaps no aspect of methodology is more neglected in complex sys-
tems science than this one. While it is always perfectly legitimate to
announce a new mechanism as a way of generating a phenomenon, it
is far too common for it to be called the way to do it, and vanishingly
rare to find an examination of how it differs from previously-proposed
mechanisms. Newman and Palmer’s work on extinction models [157]
stands out in this regard for its painstaking examination of the ways of
discriminating between the various proposals in the literature.
7. Information Theory
Information theory began as a branch of communications engineering,
quantifying the length of codes needed to represent randomly-varying
signals, and the rate at which data can be transmitted over noisy chan-
nels. The concepts needed to solve these problems turn out to be quite
fundamental measures of the uncertainty, variability, and the interde-
pendence of different variables. Information theory thus is an important
tool for studying complex systems, and in addition is indispensable for
understanding complexity measures (§1.8).
7.1 Basic Definitions
Our notation and terminology follows that of Cover and Thomas’s
standard textbook [158].
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Given a random variable X taking values in a discrete set A, the
entropy or information content H[X] of X is
H[X] ≡ −
∑
a∈A
Pr(X = a) log2 Pr(X = a) . (1.41)
H[X] is the expectation value of − log2 Pr(X). It represents the un-
certainty in X, interpreted as the mean number of binary distinctions
(bits) needed to identify the value of X. Alternately, it is the minimum
number of bits needed to encode or describe X. Note that H[X] = 0 if
and only if X is (almost surely) constant.
The joint entropy H[X,Y ] of two variables X and Y is the entropy
of their joint distribution:
H[X,Y ] ≡ −
∑
a∈A,b∈B
Pr(X = a, Y = b) log2 Pr(X = a, Y = b) .(1 42)
The conditional entropy of X given Y is
H[X|Y ] ≡ H[X,Y ]−H[Y ] . (1.43)
H[X|Y ] is the average uncertainty remaining in X, given a knowledge
of Y .
The mutual information I[X;Y ] between X and Y is
I[X;Y ] ≡ H[X]−H[X|Y ] . (1.44)
It gives the reduction in X’s uncertainty due to knowledge of Y and is
symmetric in X and Y . We can also define higher-order mutual infor-
mations, such as the third-order information I[X;Y ;Z],
I[X;Y ;Z] ≡ H[X] +H[Y ] +H[Z]−H[X,Y,Z] (1.45)
and so on for higher orders. These functions reflect the joint dependence
among the variables.
Mutual information is a special case of the relative entropy, also
called the Kullback-Leibler divergence (or distance). Given two
distributions (not variables), P and Q, the entropy of Q relative to P is
D(P‖Q) ≡
∑
x
P(x) log
P(x)
Q(x)
(1.46)
D measures how far apart the two distributions are, since D(P||Q) ≥ 0,
and D(P‖Q) = 0 implies the two distributions are equal almost every-
where. The divergence can be interpreted either in terms of codes (see
below), or in terms of statistical tests [159]. Roughly speaking, given n
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samples drawn from the distribution P, the probability of our accepting
the false hypothesis that the distribution is Q can go down no faster
than 2−nD(P‖Q). The mutual information I[X;Y ] is the divergence be-
tween the joint distribution Pr(X,Y ), and the product of the marginal
distributions, Pr(X)Pr(Y ), and so measures the departure from inde-
pendence.
Some extra information-theoretic quantities make sense for time series
and stochastic processes. Supposing we have a process X¯ =
. . . ,X−2,X−1,X0,X1,X2, . . ., we can define its mutual information
function by analogy with the autocovariance function (see §1.3.2),
IX¯(s, t) = I[Xs;Xt] (1.47)
IX¯(τ) = I[Xt;Xt+τ ] (1.48)
where the second form is valid only for strictly stationary processes.
The mutual information function measures the degree to which different
parts of the series are dependent on each other.
The entropy rate h of a stochastic process
h ≡ lim
L→∞
H[X0|X−1−L] (1.49)
= H[X0|X−1−∞] . (1.50)
(The limit always exists for stationary processes.) h measures the pro-
cess’s unpredictability, in the sense that it is the uncertainty which re-
mains in the next measurement even given complete knowledge of its
past. In nonlinear dynamics, h is called the Kolmogorov-Sinai (KS)
entropy.
For continuous variables, one can define the entropy via an integral,
H[X] ≡ −
∫
p(x) log p(x)dx , (1.51)
with the subtlety that the continuous entropy not only can be negative,
but depends on the coordinate system used for x. The relative entropy
also has the obvious definition,
D(P‖Q) ≡
∫
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
dx (1.52)
but is coordinate-independent and non-negative. So, hence, is the mu-
tual information.
Optimal Coding. One of the basic results of information theory
concerns codes, or schemes for representing random variables by bit
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strings. That is, we want a scheme which associates each value of a
random variable X with a bit string. Clearly, if we want to keep the
average length of our code-words small, we should give shorter codes
to the more common values of X. It turns out that the average code-
length is minimized if we use − log Pr(x) bits to encode x, and it is
always possible to come within one bit of this. Then, on average, we will
use E [− log Pr(x)] = H[X] bits.
This presumes we know the true probabilities. If we think the true dis-
tribution is Q when it is really P, we will, on average, useE [− logQ(x)] ≥
H[X]. This quantity is called the cross-entropy or inaccuracy, and
is equal to H[X] +D(P‖Q). Thus, finding the correct probability dis-
tribution is equivalent to minimizing the cross-entropy, or the relative
entropy [160].
The Khinchin Axioms and Re´nyi Information. In 1953, A. I.
Khinchin published a list of four reasonable-looking axioms for a mea-
sure of the information H[X] associated with a random variable X [161].
He then proved that the Shannon information was the unique functional
satisfying the axioms, up to an over-all multiplicative constant. (The
choice of this constant is equivalent to the choice of the base for loga-
rithms.) The axioms were as follows.
The information is a functional of the probability distribution of
X, and not on any of its other properties. In particular, if f is any
invertible function, H[X] = H[f(X)].
The information is maximal for the uniform distribution, where all
events are equally probable.
The information is unchanged by enlarging the probability space
with events of zero probability.
If the probability space is divided into two sub-spaces, so that X
is split into two variables Y and Z, the total information is equal
to the information content of the marginal distribution of one sub-
space, plus the mean information of the conditional distribution of
the other sub-space: H[X] = H[Y ] +E [H(Z|Y )].
A similar axiomatic treatment can be given for the mutual information
and the relative entropy.
While the first three of Khinchin’s axioms are all highly plausible, the
fourth is somewhat awkward. It is intuitively more plausible to merely
require that, if Y and Z are independent, then H[Y,Z] = H[Y ] +H[Z].
If the fourth axiom is weakened in this way, however, there is no longer
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only a single functional satisfying the axioms. Instead, any of the infinite
family of entropies introduced by Re´nyi satisfies the axioms. The Re´nyi
entropy of order α, with α any non-negative real number, is
Hα[X] ≡ 1
1− α log
∑
i:pi>0
pαi (1.53)
in the discrete case, and the corresponding integral in the continuous
case. The parameter α can be thought of as gauging how strongly
the entropy is biased towards low-probability events. As α → 0, low-
probability events count more, until at α = 0, all possible events receive
equal weight. (This is sometimes called the topological entropy.) As
α→∞, only the highest-probability event contributes to the sum. One
can show that, as α→ 1, Hα[X]→ H[X], i.e., one recovers the ordinary
Shannon entropy in the limit. There are entropy rates corresponding to
all the Re´nyi entropies, defined just like the ordinary entropy rate. For
dynamical systems, these are related to the fractal dimensions of the
attractor [162, 163].
The Re´nyi divergences bear the same relation to the Re´nyi en-
tropies as the Kullback-Leibler divergence does to the Shannon entropy.
The defining formula is
Dα(P||Q) ≡ 1
α− 1 log
∑
qi
(
pi
qi
)α
(1.54)
and similarly for the continuous case. Once again, limα→1Dα(P||Q) =
D(P||Q). For all α > 0, Dα(P||Q) ≥ 0, and is equal to zero if and only
if P and Q are the same. (If α = 0, then a vanishing Re´nyi divergence
only means that the supports of the two distributions are the same.) The
Re´nyi entropy Hα[X] is non-increasing as α grows, whereas the Re´nyi
divergence Dα(P||Q) is non-decreasing.
Estimation of Information-Theoretic Quantities. In applica-
tions, we will often want to estimate information-theoretic quantities,
such as the Shannon entropy or the mutual information, from empirical
or simulation data. Restricting our attention, for the moment, to the
case of discrete-valued variables, the empirical distribution will gener-
ally converge on the true distribution, and so the entropy (say) of the
empirical distribution (“sample entropy”) will also converge on the true
entropy. However, it is not the case that the sample entropy is an unbi-
ased estimate of the true entropy. The Shannon (and Re´nyi) entropies
are measures of variation, like the variance, and sampling tends to reduce
variation. Just as the sample variance is a negatively biased estimate of
the true variance, sample entropy is a negatively-biased estimate of the
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true entropy, and so sample mutual information is a positively-biased
estimate of true information. Understanding and controlling the bias,
as well as the sampling fluctuations, can be very important.
Victor [164] has given an elegant method for calculating the bias of
the sample entropy; remarkably, the leading-order term depends only on
the alphabet size k and the number of samples N , and is (k − 1)/2N .
Higher-order terms, however, depend on the true distribution. Recently,
Kraskov et al. [165] have published an adaptive algorithm for estimating
mutual information, which has very good properties in terms of both bias
and variance. Finally, the estimation of entropy rates is a somewhat
tricky matter. The best practices are to either use an algorithm of
the type given by [166], or to fit a properly dynamical model. (For
discrete data, variable-length Markov chains, discussed in §1.3.6.2 above,
generally work very well, and the entropy rate can be calculated from
them very simply.) Another popular approach is to run one’s time series
through a standard compression algorithm, such as gzip, dividing the
size in bits of the output by the number of symbols in the input [167].
This is an absolutely horrible idea; even under the circumstances under
which it gives a consistent estimate of the entropy rate, it converges
much more slowly, and runs more slowly, than employing either of the
two techniques just mentioned [168, 169].20
7.2 Applications of Information Theory
Beyond its original home in communications engineering, informa-
tion theory has found a multitude of applications in statistics [159, 160]
and learning theory [144, 170]. Scientifically, it is very natural to con-
sider some biological systems as communications channels, and so ana-
lyze their information content; this has been particularly successful for
biopolymer sequences [171] and especially for neural systems, where the
analysis of neural codes depends vitally on information theory [172, 173].
However, there is nothing prohibiting the application of information the-
ory to systems which are not designed to function as communications
devices; the concepts involved require only well-defined probability dis-
tributions. For instance, in nonlinear dynamics [174, 175] information-
theoretic notions are very important in characterizing different kinds of
dynamical system (see also §1.3.6). Even more closely tied to complex
systems science is the literature on “physics and information” or “physics
and computation”, which investigates the relationships between the me-
chanical principles of physics and information theory, e.g., Landauer’s
principle, that erasing (but not storing) a bit of information at tem-
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perature T produces kBT ln 2 joules of heat, where kB is Boltzmann’s
constant.
8. Complexity Measures
We have already given some thought to complexity, both in our ini-
tial rough definition of “complex system” and in our consideration of
machine learning and Occam’s Razor. In the latter, we saw that the rel-
evant sense of “complexity” has to do with families of models: a model
class is complex if it requires large amounts of data to reliably find the
best model in the class. On the other hand, we initially said that a
complex system is one with many highly variable, strongly interdepen-
dent parts. Here, we will consider various proposals for putting some
mathematical spine into that notion of a system’s complexity, as well as
the relationship to the notion of complexity of learning.
Most measures of complexity for systems formalize the intuition that
something is complex if it is difficult to describe adequately. The first
mathematical theory based on this idea was proposed by Kolmogorov;
while it is not good for analyzing empirical complex systems, it was very
important historically, and makes a good point of entry into the field.
8.1 Algorithmic Complexity
Consider a collection of measured data-values, stored in digitized form
on a computer. We would like to say that they are complex if they
are hard to describe, and measure their complexity by the difficulty of
describing them. The central idea of Kolmogorov complexity (proposed
independently by Solomonoff [176] and Chaitin) is that one can describe
the data set by writing a program which will reproduce the data. The
difficulty of description is then measured by the length of the program.
Anyone with much experience of other people’s code will appreciate that
it is always possible to write a longer, slower program to do a given job,
so what we are really interested in is the shortest program that can
exactly replicate the data.
To introduce some symbols, let x be the data, and |x| their size in bits.
The Kolmogorov or algorithmic complexity of x, K(x), is the length of
the shortest program that will output x and then stop21. Clearly, there
is always some program which will output x and then stop, for instance,
“print(x); end”. ThusK(x) ≤ |x|+c, where c is the length of the print
and end instructions. This is what one might call a literal description
of the data. If one cannot do better than this — if K(x) ≈ |x| — then
x is highly complex. Some data, however, is highly compressible. For
Overview of Methods and Techniques 53
instance, if x consists of the second quadrillion digits of π, a very short
program suffices to generate it22.
As you may already suspect, the number of simple data sets is quite
limited. Suppose we have a data set of size n bits, and we want to
compress it by k bits, i.e., find a program for it which is n− k bits long.
There are at most 2n−k programs of that length, so of all the 2n data sets
of size n, the fraction which can be compressed by k bits is at most 2−k.
The precise degree of compression does not matter — when we look at
large data sets, almost all of them are highly complex. If we pick a large
data set at random, then the odds are very good that it will be complex.
We can state this more exactly if we think about our data as consisting
of the first n measurements from some sequence, and let n grow. That
is, x = xn1 , and we are interested in the asymptotic behavior of K(x
n
1 ). If
the measurements xi are independent and identically distributed (IID),
then K(xn1 )/|x| → 1 almost surely; IID sequences are incompressible.
If x is a realization of a stationary (but not necessarily IID) random
process X¯, then [177, 10]
lim
n→∞
E
[
K(Xn1 )
n
]
= h(X¯) , (1.55)
the entropy rate (§1.7) of X¯. Thus, random data has high complexity,
and the complexity of a random process grows at a rate which just
measures its unpredictability.
This observation goes the other way: complex data looks random.
The heuristic idea is that if there were any regularities in the data,
we could use them to shave at least a little bit off the length of the
minimal program. What one can show formally is that incompressible
sequences have all the properties of IID sequences — they obey the law
of large numbers and the central limit theorem, pass all statistical tests
for randomness, etc. In fact, this possibility, of defining “random” as
“incompressible”, is what originally motivated Kolmogorov’s work [107,
chapter 3].
Kolmogorov complexity is thus a very important notion for the foun-
dations of probability theory, and it has extensive applications in theo-
retical computer science [177] and even some aspects of statistical physics
[178]. Unfortunately, it is quite useless as a measure of the complexity
of natural systems. This is for two reasons. First, as we have just seen,
it is maximized by independent random variables; we want strong depen-
dence. Second, and perhaps more fundamental, it is simply not possible
to calculate Kolmogorov complexity. For deep reasons related to Go¨del’s
Theorem, there cannot be any procedure for calculating K(x), nor are
there any accurate approximation procedures [177].
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Many scientists are strangely in denial about the Kolmogorov com-
plexity, in that they think they can calculate it. Apparently unaware
of the mathematical results, but aware of the relationship between Kol-
mogorov complexity and data compression, they reason that file com-
pression utilities should provide an estimate of the algorithmic informa-
tion content. Thus one finds many papers which might be titled “gzip
as a measure of complexity”23, and the practice is even recommended
by some otherwise-reliable sources (e.g., [73]). However, this is simply a
confused idea, with absolutely nothing to be said in its defense.
8.2 Refinements of Algorithmic Complexity
We saw just now that algorithmic information is really a measure of
randomness, and that it is maximized by collections of independent ran-
dom variables. Since complex systems have many strongly dependent
variables, it follows that the Kolmogorov notion is not the one we really
want to measure. It has long been recognized that we really want some-
thing which is small both for systems which are strongly ordered (i.e.,
have only a small range of allowable behavior) and for those which are
strongly disordered (i.e., have independent parts). Many ways of mod-
ifying the algorithmic information to achieve this have been proposed;
two of them are especially noteworthy.
8.2.1 Logical Depth. Bennett [179–181] proposed the notion
of the logical depth of data as a measure of its complexity. Roughly
speaking, the logical depth L(x) of x is the number of computational
steps the minimal program for x must execute. For incompressible data,
the minimal program is print(x), so L(x) ≈ |x|. For periodic data, the
minimal program cycles over printing out one period over and over, so
L(x) ≈ |x| again. For some compressible data, however, the minimal
program must do non-trivial computations, which are time-consuming.
Thus, to produce the second quadrillion digits of π, the minimal program
is one which calculates the digits, and this takes considerably more time
than reading them out of a list. Thus, π is deep, while random or
periodic data are shallow.
While logical depth is a clever and appealing idea, it suffers from a
number of drawbacks. First, real data are not, so far as we know, actually
produced by running their minimal programs24, and the run-time of that
program has no known physical significance, and that’s not for lack of
attempts to find one [182]. Second, and perhaps more decisively, there
is still no procedure for finding the minimal program.
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8.2.2 Algorithmic Statistics. Perhaps the most important
modification of the Kolmogorov complexity is that proposed by Ga´cs,
Tromp and Vitanyi [183], under the label of “algorithmic statistics”.
Observe that, when speaking of the minimal program for x, I said noth-
ing about the inputs to the program; these are to be built in to the
code. It is this which accounts for the length of the programs needed to
generate random sequences: almost all of the length of print(x) comes
from x, not print(). This suggests splitting the minimal program into
two components, a “model” part, the program properly speaking, and
an “data” part, the inputs to the program. We want to put all the reg-
ularities in x into the model, and all the arbitrary, noisy parts of x into
the inputs. Just as in probability theory a “statistic” is a function of the
data which summarizes the information they convey, Ga´cs et al. regard
the model part of the program as an algorithmic statistic, summa-
rizing its regularities. To avoid the trivial regularity of print() when
possible, they define a notion of a sufficient algorithmic statistic, based
on the idea that x should be in some sense a typical output of the model
(see their paper for details). They then define the complexity of x, or, as
they prefer to call it, the sophistication, as the length of the shortest
sufficient algorithmic statistic.
Like logical depth, sophistication is supposed to discount the purely
random part of algorithmic complexity. Unlike logical depth, it stays
within the confines of description in doing so; programs, here, are just
a particular, mathematically tractable, kind of description. Unfortu-
nately, the sophistication is still uncomputable, so there is no real way
of applying algorithmic statistics.
8.3 Statistical Measures of Complexity
The basic problem with algorithmic complexity and its extensions is
that they are all about finding the shortest way of exactly describing a
single configuration. Even if we could compute these measures, we might
suspect, on the basis of our discussion of over-fitting in §1.2 above, that
this is not what we want. Many of the details of any particular set of
data are just noise, and will not generalize to other data sets obtained
from the same system. If we want to characterize the complexity of the
system, it is precisely the generalizations that we want, and not the noisy
particulars. Looking at the sophistication, we saw the idea of picking out,
from the overall description, the part which describes the regularities of
the data. This idea becomes useful and operational when we abandon
the goal of exact description, and allow ourselves to recognize that the
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world is full of noise, which is easy to describe statistically; we want a
statistical, and not an algorithmic, measure of complexity.
I will begin with what is undoubtedly the most widely-used statistical
measure of complexity, Rissanen’s stochastic complexity, which can
also be considered a method of model selection. Then I will look at three
attempts to isolate the complexity of the system as such, by considering
how much information would be required to predict its behavior, if we
had an optimal statistical model of the system.
8.3.1 Stochastic Complexity and the Minimum Description
Length. Suppose we have a statistical model with some parameter θ,
and we observe the data x. The model assigns a certain likelihood to the
data, Prθ(X = x). One can make this into a loss function by taking its
negative logarithm: L(θ, x) = − log Prθ(X = x). Maximum likelihood
estimation minimizes this loss function. We also learned, in §1.7, that if
Prθ is the correct probability distribution, the optimal coding scheme will
use − log Prθ(X = x) bits to encode x. Thus, maximizing the likelihood
can also be thought of as minimizing the encoded length of the data.
However, we do not yet have a complete description: we have an
encoded version of the data, but we have not said what the encoding
scheme, i.e., the model, is. Thus, the total description length has two
parts:
C(x, θ,Θ) = L(x, θ) +D(θ,Θ) (1.56)
where D(θ,Θ) is the number of bits we need to specify θ from among the
set of all our models Θ. L(x, θ) represents the “noisy” or arbitrary part
of the description, the one which will not generalize; the model represents
the part which does generalize. If D(θ,Θ) gives short codes to simple
models, we have the desired kind of trade-off, where we can reduce the
part of the data which looks like noise only by using a more elaborate
model. The minimum description length principle [184, 185] en-
joins us to pick the model which minimizes the description length, and
the stochastic complexity of the data is that minimized description-
length:
θMDL = argmin
θ
C(x, θ,Θ) (1.57)
CSC(x,Θ) = min
θ
C(x, θ,Θ) (1.58)
Under not-too-onerous conditions on the underlying data-generating pro-
cess and the model class Θ [185, chapter 3], as we provide more data
θMDL will converge on the model in Θ which minimizes the generaliza-
tion error, which here is just the same as minimizing the Kullback-Leibler
divergence from the true distribution25.
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Regarded as a principle of model selection, MDL has proved very
successful in many applications, even when dealing with quite intricate,
hierarchically-layered model classes. ([186] is a nice recent application to
a biomedical complex system; see §1.3.4 for applications to state-space
reconstruction.) It is important to recognize, however, that most of this
success comes from carefully tuning the model-coding term D(θ,Θ) so
that models which do not generalize well turn out to have long encodings.
This is perfectly legitimate, but it relies on the tact and judgment of the
scientist, and often, in dealing with a complex system, we have no idea,
or at least no good idea, what generalizes and what does not. If we were
malicious, or short-sighted, we can always insure that the particular data
we got have a stochastic complexity of just one bit26. The model which
gives us this complexity will then have absolutely horrible generalization
properties27.
Whatever its merits as a model selection method, stochastic complex-
ity does not make a good measure of the complexity of natural systems.
There are at least three reasons for this.
1 The dependence on the model-encoding scheme, already discussed.
2 The log-likelihood term, L(x, θ) in CSC can be decomposed into
two parts, one of which is related to the entropy rate of the data-
generating process, and so reflects its intrinsic unpredictability.
The other, however, indicates the degree to which even the most
accurate model in Θ is misspecified. Thus it reflects our ineptness
as modelers, rather than any characteristic of the process.
3 Finally, the stochastic complexity reflects the need to specify some
particular model, and to represent this specification. While this is
necessarily a part of the modeling process for us, it seems to have
no physical significance; the system does not need to represent its
organization, it just has it.
8.3.2 Complexity via Prediction.
Forecast Complexity and Predictive Information. Motivated
in part by concerns such as these, Grassberger [187] suggested a new
and highly satisfactory approach to system complexity: complexity is
the amount of information required for optimal prediction. Let us first
see why this idea is plausible, and then see how it can be implemented
in practice. (My argument does not follow that of Grassberger particu-
larly closely. Also, while I confine myself to time series, for clarity, the
argument generalizes to any kind of prediction [188].)
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We have seen that there is a limit on the accuracy of any predic-
tion of a given system, set by the characteristics of the system itself
(limited precision of measurement, sensitive dependence on initial con-
ditions, etc.). Suppose we had a model which was maximally predictive,
i.e., its predictions were at this limit of accuracy. Prediction, as I said,
is always a matter of mapping inputs to outputs; here the inputs are
the previous values of the time series. However, not all aspects of the
entire past are relevant. In the extreme case of independent, identically-
distributed values, no aspects of the past are relevant. In the case of
periodic sequences with period p, one only needs to know which of the
p phases the sequence is in. If we ask how much information about the
past is relevant in these two cases, the answers are clearly 0 and log p,
respectively. If one is dealing with a Markov chain, only the present
state is relevant, so the amount of information needed for optimal pre-
diction is just equal to the amount of information needed to specify the
current state. One thus has the nice feeling that both highly random
(IID) and highly ordered (low-period deterministic) sequences are of low
complexity, and more interesting cases can get high scores.
More formally, any predictor f will translate the past of the sequence
x− into an effective state, s = f(x−), and then make its prediction on
the basis of s. (This is true whether f is formally a state-space model or
not.) The amount of information required to specify the state is H[S].
We can take this to be the complexity of f . Now, if we confine our atten-
tion to the set M of maximally predictive models, we can define what
Grassberger called the “true measure complexity” or “forecast complex-
ity” of the process as the minimal amount of information needed for
optimal prediction:
C = min
f∈M
H[f(X−)] (1.59)
Grassberger did not provide a procedure for finding the maximally
predictive models, nor for minimizing the information required among
them. He did, however, make the following observation. A basic result of
information theory, called the data-processing inequality, says that
I[A;B] ≥ I[f(A);B], for any variables A and B — we cannot get more
information out of data by processing it than was in there to begin with.
Since the state of the predictor is a function of the past, it follows that
I[X−;X+] ≥ I[f(X−);X+]. Presumably, for optimal predictors, the
two informations are equal — the predictor’s state is just as informative
as the original data. (Otherwise, the model would be missing some
potential predictive power.) But another basic inequality is that H[A] ≥
I[A;B] — no variable contains more information about another than
it does about itself. So, for optimal models, H[f(X−)] ≥ I[X−;X+].
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The latter quantity, which Grassberger called the effective measure
complexity, can be estimated purely from data, without intervening
models. This quantity — the mutual information between the past and
the future — has been rediscovered many times, in many contexts, and
called excess entropy (in statistical mechanics), stored information
[189], complexity [190–192] or predictive information [193]; the last
name is perhaps the clearest. Since it quantifies the degree of statistical
dependence between the past and the future, it is clearly appealing as a
measure of complexity.
The Grassberger-Crutchfield-Young Statistical Complexity.
The forecasting complexity notion was made fully operational by Crutch-
field and Young [102, 194], who provided an effective procedure for find-
ing the minimal maximally predictive model and its states. They began
by defining the causal states of a process, as follows. For each his-
tory x−, there is some conditional distribution of future observations,
Pr(X+|x−). Two histories x−1 and x−2 are equivalent if Pr(X+|x−1 ) =
Pr(X+|x−2 ). Write the set of all histories equivalent to x− as [x−]. Now
we have a function ǫ which maps each history into its equivalence class:
ǫ(x−) = [x−]. Clearly, Pr(X+|ǫ(x−)) = Pr(X+|x−). Crutchfield and
Young accordingly proposed to forget the particular history and retain
only its equivalence class, which they claimed would involve no loss of
predictive power; this was later proved to be correct [195, theorem 1].
They called the equivalence classes the “causal states” of the process,
and claimed that these were the simplest states with maximal predictive
power; this is also was right [195, theorem 2]. Finally, one can show that
the causal states are the unique optimal states [195, theorem 3]; any
other optimal predictor is really a disguised version of the causal states.
Accordingly, they defined the statistical complexity of a process C as
the information content of its causal states.
Because the causal states are purely an objective property of the pro-
cess being considered, C is too; it does not depend at all on our modeling
or means of description. It is equal to the length of the shortest descrip-
tion of the past which is relevant to the actual dynamics of the system.
As we argued should be the case above, for IID sequences it is exactly
0, and for periodic sequences it is log p. One can show [195, theorems
5 and 6] that the statistical complexity is always at least as large as
the predictive information, and generally that it measures how far the
system departs from statistical independence.
The causal states have, from a statistical point of view, quite a number
of desirable properties. The maximal prediction property corresponds
exactly to that of being a sufficient statistic [159]; in fact they are mini-
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mal sufficient statistics [159, 195]. The sequence of states of the process
form a Markov chain. Referring back to our discussion of filtering and
state estimation (§1.3.5), one can design a recursive filter which will
eventually estimate the causal state without any error at all; moreover,
it is always clear whether the filter has “locked on” to the correct state
or not.
All of these properties of the causal states and the statistical com-
plexity extend naturally to spatially-extended systems, including, but
not limited to, cellular automata [196, 197]. Each point in space then
has its own set of causal states, which form not a Markov chain but a
Markov field, and the local causal state is the minimal sufficient statistic
for predicting the future of that point. The recursion properties carry
over, not just temporally but spatially: the state at one point, at one
time, helps determine not only the state at that same point at later
times, but also the state at neighboring points at the same time. The
statistical complexity, in these spatial systems, becomes the amount of
information needed about the past of a given point in order to opti-
mally predict its future. Systems with a high degree of local statistical
complexity are ones with intricate spatio-temporal organization, and,
experimentally, increasing statistical complexity gives a precise formal-
ization of intuitive notions of self-organization [197].
Crutchfield and Young were inspired by analogies to the theory of
abstract automata, which led them to call their theory, somewhat con-
fusingly, computational mechanics. Their specific initial claims for
the causal states were based on a procedure for deriving the minimal
automaton capable of producing a given family of sequences28 known as
Nerode equivalence classing [198]. In addition to the theoretical develop-
ment, the analogy to Nerode equivalence-classing led them to describe
a procedure [102] for estimating the causal states and the ǫ-machine
from empirical data, at least in the case of discrete sequences. This
Crutchfield-Young algorithm has actually been successfully used to an-
alyze empirical data, for instance, geomagnetic fluctuations [199]. The
algorithm has, however, been superseded by a newer algorithm which
uses the known properties of the causal states to guide the model dis-
covery process [105] (see §1.3.6.3 above).
Let me sum up. The Grassberger-Crutchfield-Young statistical com-
plexity is an objective property of the system being studied. It reflects
the intrinsic difficulty of predicting it, namely the amount of information
which is actually relevant to the system’s dynamics. It is low both for
highly disordered and trivially-ordered systems. Above all, it is calcula-
ble, and has actually been calculated for a range of natural and math-
ematical systems. While the initial formulation was entirely in terms
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of discrete time series, the theory can be extended straightforwardly
to spatially-extended dynamical systems [196], where it quantifies self-
organization [197], to controlled dynamical systems and transducers, and
to prediction problems generally [188].
8.4 Power Law Distributions
Over the last decade or so, it has become reasonably common to
see people (especially physicists) claiming that some system or other
is complex, because it exhibits a power law distribution of event sizes.
Despite its popularity, this is simply a fallacy. No one has demonstrated
any relation between power laws and any kind of formal complexity
measure. Nor is there any link tying power laws to our intuitive idea of
complex systems as ones with strongly interdependent parts.
It is true that, in equilibrium statistical mechanics, one does not find
power laws except near phase transitions [200], when the system is com-
plex by our standard. This has encouraged physicists to equate power
laws as such with complexity. Despite this, it has been known for half
a century [5] that there are many, many ways of generating power laws,
just as there are many mechanisms which can produce Poisson distribu-
tions, or Gaussians. Perhaps the simplest one is that recently demon-
strated by Reed and Hughes [201], namely exponential growth coupled
with random observation times. The observation of power laws alone
thus says nothing about complexity (except in thermodynamic equilib-
rium!), and certainly is not a reliable sign of some specific favored mech-
anism, such as self-organized criticality [202, 203] or highly-optimized
tolerance [204–206].
8.4.1 Statistical Issues Relating to Power Laws. The
statistics of power laws are poorly understood within the field of complex
systems, to a degree which is quite surprising considering how much
attention has been paid to them. To be quite honest, there is little reason
to think that many of the things claimed to be power laws actually are
such, as opposed to some other kind of heavy-tailed distribution. This
brief section will attempt to inoculate the reader against some common
mistakes, most of which are related to the fact that a power law makes
a straight line on a log-log plot. Since it would be impractical to cite
all papers which commit these mistakes, and unfair to cite only some
of them I will omit references here; interested readers will be able to
assemble collections of their own very rapidly.
Parameter Estimation. Presuming that something is a power
law, a natural way of estimating its exponent is to use linear regression
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to find the line of best fit to the points on the log-log plot. This is actu-
ally a consistent estimator, if the data really do come from a power law.
However, the loss function used in linear regression is the sum of the
squared distances between the line and the points (“least squares”). In
general, the line minimizing the sum of squared errors is not a valid prob-
ability distribution, and so this is simply not a reliable way to estimate
the distribution.
One is much better off using maximum likelihood to estimate the pa-
rameter. With a discrete variable, the probability function is Pr(X =
x) = x−α/ζ(α), where ζ(α) =
∑∞
k=1 k
−α is the Riemann zeta func-
tion, which ensures that the probability is normalized. Thus the max-
imum likelihood estimate of the exponent is obtained by minimizing
the negative log-likelihood, L(α) =
∑
i α log xi + log ζ(α), i.e., L(α) is
our loss function. In the continuous case, the probability density is
(α− 1)cα−1/xα, with x ≥ c > 0.
Error Estimation. Most programs to do linear regression also
provide an estimate of the standard error in the estimated slope, and one
sometimes sees this reported as the uncertainty in the power law. This is
an entirely unacceptable procedure. Those calculations of the standard
error assume that measured values having Gaussian fluctuations around
their true means. Here that would mean that the log of the empirical
relative frequency is equal to the log of the probability plus Gaussian
noise. However, by the central limit theorem, one knows that the relative
frequency is equal to the probability plus Gaussian noise, so the former
condition does not hold. Notice that one can obtain asymptotically
reliable standard errors from maximum likelihood estimation.
Validation; R2. Perhaps the most pernicious error is that of trying
to validate the assumption of a power law distribution by either eye-
balling the fit to a straight line, or evaluating it using the R2 statistic,
i.e., the fraction of the variance accounted for by the least-squares regres-
sion line. Unfortunately, while these procedures are good at confirming
that something is a power law, if it really is (low Type I error, or high
statistical significance), they are very bad at alerting you to things that
are not power laws (they have a very high rate of Type II error, or low
statistical power). The basic problem here is that any smooth curve
looks like a straight line, if you confine your attention to a sufficiently
small region — and for some non-power-law distributions, such “suffi-
ciently small” regions can extend over multiple orders of magnitude.
To illustrate this last point, consider Figure 1.5, made by generating
10,000 random numbers according to a log-normal distribution, with a
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Figure 1.5. Distribution of 10,000 random numbers, generated according to a log-
normal distribution with E [logX] = 0 and σ(logX) = 3.
mean log of 0 and a standard deviation in the log of 3. Restricting
attention to the “tail” of random numbers ≥ 1, and doing a usual least-
squares fit, gives the line shown in Figure 1.6. One might hope that it
would be easy to tell that this data does not come from a power law, since
there are a rather large number of observations (5,112), extending over
a wide domain (more than four orders of magnitude). Nonetheless, R2
is 0.962. This, in and of itself, constitutes a demonstration that getting
a high R2 is not a reliable indicator that one’s data was generated by a
power law.29
An Illustration: Blogging. An amusing empirical illustration
of the difficulty of distinguishing between power laws and other heavy-
tailed distributions is provided by political weblogs, or “blogs” — web-
sites run by individuals or small groups providing links and commentary
on news, political events, and the writings of other blogs. A rough indi-
cation of the prominence of a blog is provided by the number of other
blogs linking to it — its in-degree. (For more on network terminology,
see Wuchty, Ravasz and Baraba´si, this volume.) A widely-read essay by
Shirky claimed that the distribution of in-degree follows a power law,
and used that fact, and the literature on the growth of scale-free net-
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Figure 1.6. Inability of linear regression on log-log plots to correctly identify power
law distributions. Simulation data (circles) and resulting least-squares fit (line) for
the 5,112 points in Figure 1.5 for which x ≥ 1. The R2 of the regression line is 0.962.
works, to draw a number of conclusions about the social organization
of the blogging community [207]. A more recent paper by Drenzer and
Farrell [208], in the course of studying the role played by blogs in general
political debate, re-examined the supposed power-law distribution.30 Us-
ing a large population of inter-connected blogs, they found a definitely
heavy-tailed distribution which, on a log-log plot, was quite noticeably
concave (1.7); nonetheless, R2 for the conventional regression line was
0.898.
Maximum likelihood fitting of a power law distribution gave α =
−1.30±0.006, with a negative log-likelihood of 18481.51. Similarly fitting
a log-normal distribution gave E [logX] = 2.60 ± 0.02 and σ(logX) =
1.48 ± 0.02, with a negative log-likelihood of 17,218.22. As one can see
from Figure 1.8, the log-normal provides a very good fit to almost all
of the data, whereas even the best fitting power-law distribution is not
very good at all.31
A rigorous application of the logic of error testing [50] would now
consider the probability of getting at least this good a fit to a log-normal
if the data were actually generated by a power law. However, since in
this case the data were e18481.51−17218.22 ≈ 13 million times more likely
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Figure 1.7. Empirical distribution of the in-degrees of political weblogs (“blogs”).
Horizontal axis: number of incoming links d; vertical axis: fraction of all blogs with
at least that many links, Pr(D ≥ d); both axes are on a log-log scale. Circles show
the actual distribution; the straight line is a least-squares fit to these values. This
does not produce a properly normalized probability distribution but it does have an
R
2 of 0.898, despite the clear concavity of the curve.
under the log-normal distribution, any sane test would reject the power-
law hypothesis.
8.5 Other Measures of Complexity
Considerations of space preclude an adequate discussion of further
complexity measures. It will have to suffice to point to some of the
leading ones. The thermodynamic depth of Lloyd and Pagels [182]
measures the amount of information required to specify a trajectory
leading to a final state, and is related both to departure from thermody-
namic equilibrium and to retrodiction [209]. Huberman and Hogg [210],
and later Wolpert and Macready [211] proposed to measure complexity
as the dissimilarity between different levels of a given system, on the
grounds that self-similar structures are actually very easy to describe.
(Say what one level looks like, and then add that all the rest are the
same!) Wolpert and Macready’s measure of self-dissimilarity is, in turn,
closely related to a complexity measure proposed by Sporns, Tononi and
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Figure 1.8. Maximum likelihood fits of log-normal (solid line) and power law (dashed
line) distributions to the data from Figure 1.7 (circles); axes as in that figure. Note
the extremely tight fit of the log-normal over the whole range of the curve, and the
general failure of the power-law distribution.
Edelman [212–214] for biological networks, which is roughly the amount
of information present in higher-order interactions between nodes which
is not accounted for by the lower-order interactions. Badii and Politi
[10] propose a number of further hierarchical scaling complexities,
including one which measures how slowly predictions converge as more
information about the past becomes available. Other interesting ap-
proaches include the information fluctuation measure of Bates and
Shepard [215], and the predictability indices of the “school of Rome”
[216].
8.6 Relevance of Complexity Measures
Why measure complexity at all? Suppose you are interested in the
patterns of gene expressions in tumor cells and how they differ from
those of normal cells. Why should you care if I analyze your data and
declare that (say) healthy cells have a more complex expression pattern?
Assuming you are not a numerologist, the only reason you should care
is if you can learn something from that number — if the complexity
I report tells you something about the thermodynamics of the system,
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how it responds to fluctuations, how easy it is to control, etc. A good
complexity measure, in other words, is one which is relevant to many
other aspects of the system measured. A bad complexity measure lacks
such relevance; a really bad complexity measure would be positively
misleading, lumping together things with no real connection or similarity
just because they get the same score. My survey here has focused on
complexity measures which have some claim to relevance, deliberately
avoiding the large number of other measures which lack it [217].
9. Guide to Further Reading
9.1 General
There is no systematic or academically-detailed survey of the “pat-
terns” of complex systems, but there are several sound informal discus-
sions: Axelrod and Cohen [218], Flake [219], Holland [220] and Simon
[221]. The book by Simon, in particular, repays careful study.
On the “topics”, the only books I can recommend are the ones by Boc-
cara [222] and Flake [219]. The former emphasizes topics from physics,
chemistry, population ecology and epidemiology, along with analytical
methods, especially from nonlinear dynamics. Some sections will be eas-
ier to understand if one is familiar with statistical mechanics at the level
of, e.g., [200], but this is not essential. It does not, however, describe
any models of adaptation, learning, evolution, etc. Many of those topics
are covered in Flake’s book, which however is written at a much lower
level of mathematical sophistication.
On foundational issues about complexity, the best available surveys
[10, 195] both neglect the more biological aspects of the area, and assume
advanced knowledge of statistical mechanics on the part of their readers.
9.2 Data Mining and Statistical Learning
There are now two excellent introductions to statistical learning and
data mining, [223] and [31]. The former is more interested in computa-
tional issues and the initial treatment of data; the latter gives more em-
phasis to pure statistical aspects. Both are recommended unreservedly.
Baldi and Brunak [95] introduces machine learning via its applications
to bioinformatics, and so may be especially suitable for readers of this
book.
For readers seriously interested in understanding the theoretical basis
of machine learning, [224] is a good starting point. The work of Vapnik
[22, 225, 226] is fundamental; the presentation in his [22] is enlivened by
many strong and idiosyncratic opinions, pungently expressed. [40] de-
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scribes the very useful class of models called “support vector machines”,
as well as giving an extremely clear exposition of key aspects of statistical
learning theory. Those interested in going further will find that most of
the relevant literature is still in the form of journals —Machine Learning,
Journal of Machine Learning Research (free on-line at www.jmlr.org),
Neural Computation — and especially annual conference proceedings —
Computational Learning Theory (COLT), International Conference on
Machine Learning (ICML), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI),
Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD), Neural Information Process-
ing Systems (NIPS), and the regional versions of them (EuroCOLT, Pa-
cific KDD, etc.).
Much of what has been said about model selection could equally well
have been said about what engineers call system identification, and
in fact is said in good modern treatments of that area, of which [227]
may be particularly recommended.
In many respects, data mining is an extension of exploratory data
analysis; the classic work by Tukey [228] is still worth reading. No
discussion of drawing inferences from data would be complete without
mentioning the beautiful books by Tufte [229–231].
9.3 Time Series
Perhaps the best all-around references for the nonlinear dynamics ap-
proach are [69] and [232]. The former, in particular, succeeds in in-
tegrating standard principles of statistical inference into the nonlinear
dynamics method. [73], while less advanced than those two books, is a
model of clarity, and contains an integrated primer on chaotic dynamics
besides. Ruelle’s little book [162] is much more subtle than it looks,
full of deep insights. The SFI proceedings volumes [233, 234] are very
worthwhile. The journals Physica D, Physical Review E and Chaos often
have new developments.
From the statistical wing, one of the best recent textbooks is [55];
there are many, many others. That by Durbin and Koopman [60] is
particularly strong on the state-space point of view. The one by [235]
Azencott and Dacunha-Castelle is admirably clear on both the aims of
time series analysis, and the statistical theory underlying classical meth-
ods; unfortunately it typography is less easy to read than it should be.
[236] provides a comprehensive and up-to-date view of the statistical the-
ory for modern models, including strongly non-linear and non-Gaussian
models. While many of the results are directly useful in application, the
proofs rely on advanced theoretical statistics, in particular the geometric
approach pioneered by the Japanese school of Amari et al. [237], This
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information geometry has itself been applied by Ay to the study of
complex systems [238, 239].
At the interface between the statistical and the dynamical points of
view, there is an interesting conference proceedings [240] and a useful
book by Tong [241]. Pearson’s book [242] on discrete-time models is
very good on many important issues related to model selection, and
exemplifies the habit of control theorists of cheerful stealing whatever
seems helpful.
Filtering. Linear filters are well-described by many textbooks in
control theory (e.g. [243]), signal processing, time series analysis (e.g.
[55]) and stochastic dynamics (e.g. [58]).
[89] provides a readable introduction to optimal nonlinear estimation,
draws interesting analogies to non-equilibrium statistical mechanics and
turbulence, and describes a reasonable approximation scheme. [90] is an
up-to-date textbook, covering both linear and nonlinear methods, and
including a concise exposition of the essential parts of stochastic calculus.
The website run by R.W. R. Darling, www.nonlinearfiltering.webhop.net,
provides a good overview and extensive pointers to the literature.
Symbolic Dynamics and Hidden Markov Models. On sym-
bolic dynamics, formal languages and hidden Markov models generally,
see [10]. [198] is a good first course on formal languages and automata
theory. Charniak is a very readable introduction to grammatical infer-
ence. [244] is an advanced treatment of symbolic dynamics emphasizing
applications; by contrast, [116] focuses on algebraic, pure-mathematical
aspects of the subject. [163] is good on the stochastic properties of
symbolic-dynamical representations. Gershenfeld [245] gives a good mo-
tivating discussion of hidden Markov models, as does Baldi and Brunak
[95], while [94] describes advanced methods related to statistical sig-
nal processing. Open-source code for reconstructing causal-state models
from state is available from http://bactra.org/CSSR.
9.4 Cellular Automata
General. There is unfortunately no completely satisfactory unified
treatment of cellular automata above the recreational. Ilachinski [246]
attempts a general survey aimed at readers in the physical sciences, and
is fairly satisfactory on purely mathematical aspects, but is more out of
date than its year of publication suggests. Chopard and Droz [247] has
good material on models of pattern formation missing from Ilachinski,
but the English is often choppy. Toffoli and Margolus [248] is inspiring
and sound, though cast on a piece of hardware and a programming
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environment which are sadly no longer supported. Much useful material
on CA modeling has appeared in conference proceedings [249–251].
CA as Self-Reproducing Machines. The evolution of CA begins
in [252], continues in [253], and is brought up to the modern era in [254];
the last is a beautiful, thought-provoking and modest book, sadly out of
print. The modern era itself opens with [255].
Mathematical and Automata-Theoretic Aspects. Many of the
papers in [256] are interesting. Ilachinski [246], as mentioned, provides
a good survey. The Gutowitz volume [250] has good material on this
topic, too. [257] is up-to-date.
Lattice gases. [124] is a good introduction, [258] somewhat more
advanced. The pair of proceedings edited by Doolen [259, 260] describe
many interesting applications, and contain useful survey and pedagogical
articles. (There is little overlap between the two volumes.)
9.5 Agent-Based Modeling
There do not seem to be any useful textbooks or monographs on
agent-based modeling. The Artificial Life conference proceedings, start-
ing with [255], were a prime source of inspiration for agent-based mod-
eling, along with the work of Axelrod [261]. [262] is also worth reading.
The journal Artificial Life continues to be relevant, along with the From
Animals to Animats conference series. Epstein and Axtell’s book [263]
is in many ways the flagship of the “minimalist” approach to ABMs;
while the arguments in its favor (e.g., [264, 265]) are often framed in
terms of social science, many apply with equal force to biology32. [266]
illustrates how ABMs can be combined with extensive real-world data.
Other notable publications on agent-based models include [267], span-
ning social science and evolutionary biology; [268] on agent-based models
of morphogenesis; and [269] on biological self-organization.
[131] introduces object-oriented programming and the popular Java
programming language at the same time; it also discusses the roots of
object-orientation in computer simulation. There are many, many other
books on object-oriented programming.
9.6 Evaluating Models of Complex Systems
Honerkamp [58] is great, but curiously almost unknown. Gershenfeld
[245] is an extraordinary readable encyclopedia of applied mathematics,
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especially methods which can be used on real data. Gardiner [270] is
also useful.
Monte Carlo. The old book by Hammersley and Handscomb [140]
is concise, clear, and has no particular prerequisites beyond a working
knowledge of calculus and probability. [271] and [272] are both good in-
troductions for readers with some grasp of statistical mechanics. There
are also very nice discussions in [58, 31, 142]. Beckerman [143] makes
Monte Carlo methods the starting point for a fascinating and highly un-
conventional exploration of statistical mechanics, Markov random fields,
synchronization and cooperative computation in neural and perceptual
systems.
Experimental design. Bypass the cookbook texts on standard
designs, and consult Atkinson and Donev [155] directly.
Ecological inference. [273] is at once a good introduction, and
the source of important and practical new methods.
9.7 Information Theory
Information theory appeared in essentially its modern form with Shan-
non’s classic paper [274], though there had been predecessors in both
communications [275] and statistics, notably Fisher (see Kullback [159]
for an exposition of these notions), and similar ideas were developed by
Wiener and von Neumann, more or less independently of Shannon [56].
Cover and Thomas [158] is, deservedly, the standard modern textbook
and reference; it is highly suitable as an introduction, and handles al-
most every question most users will, in practice, want to ask. [276] is
a more mathematically rigorous treatment, now free on-line. On neural
information theory, [172] is seminal, well-written, still very valuable, and
largely self-contained. On the relationship between physics and informa-
tion, the best reference is still the volume edited by Zurek [12], and the
thought-provoking paper by Margolus.
9.8 Complexity Measures
The best available survey of complexity measures is that by Badii
and Politi [10]; the volume edited by Peliti and Vulpiani [277], while
dated, is still valuable. Edmonds [278] is an online bibliography, fairly
comprehensive through 1997. [195] has an extensive literature review.
On Kolmogorov complexity, see Li and Vitanyi [177]. While the idea
of measuring complexity by the length of descriptions is usually cred-
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ited to the trio of Kolmogorov, Solomonoff and Chaitin, it is implicit
in von Neumann’s 1949 lectures on the “Theory and Organization of
Complicated Automata” [252, Part I, especially pp. 42–56].
On MDL, see Rissanen’s book [185], and Gru¨nwald’s lecture notes
[279]. Vapnik [22] argues that when MDL converges on the optimal
model, SRM will too, but he assumes independent data.
On statistical complexity and causal states, see [195] for a self-contained
treatment, and [188] for extensions of the theory.
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Notes
1. Several books pretend to give a unified presentation of the topics. To date, the only
one worth reading is [222], which however omits all models of adaptive systems.
2. Not all data mining is strictly for predictive models. One can also mine for purely de-
scriptive models, which try to, say, cluster the data points so that more similar ones are closer
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together, or just assign an over-all likelihood score. These, too, can be regarded as minimiz-
ing a cost function (e.g., the dis-similarity within clusters plus the similarity across clusters).
The important point is that good descriptions, in this sense, are implicitly predictive, either
about other aspects of the data or about further data from the same source.
3. A subtle issue can arise here, in that not all errors need be equally bad for us. In
scientific applications, we normally aim at accuracy as such, and so all errors are equally bad.
But in other applications, we might care very much about otherwise small inaccuracies in
some circumstances, and shrug off large inaccuracies in others. A well-designed loss function
will represent these desires. This does not change the basic principles of learning, but it can
matter a great deal for the final machine [280].
4. Here and throughout, I try to follow the standard notation of probability theory, so
capital letters (X, Y , etc.) denote random variables, and lower-case ones particular values or
realizations — so X = the role of a die, whereas x = 5 (say).
5. This is called the convergence in probability of Lˆ(θ) to its mean value. For a
practical introduction to such convergence properties, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for them to obtain, and some thoughts about what one can do, statistically, when they do
not, see [51].
6. The precise definition of the VC dimension is somewhat involved, and omitted here
for brevity’s sake. See [224, 40] for clear discussions.
7. For instance, one can apply the independent-sample theory to learning feedback control
systems [281].
8. Actually, the principle goes back to Aristotle at least, and while Occam used it often,
he never used exactly those words [282, translator’s introduction].
9. This is very close to the notion of the power of a statistical hypothesis test [283], and
almost exactly the same as the severity of such a test [50].
10.One could, of course, build a filter which uses later y values as well; this is a non-
causal or smoothing filter. This is clearly not suitable for estimating the state in real time,
but often gives more accurate estimates when it is applicable. The discussion in the text
generally applies to smoothing filters, at some cost in extra notation.
11.Equivalent terms are future-resolving or right-resolving (from nonlinear dynamics)
and deterministic (the highly confusing contribution of automata theory).
12.Early publications on this work started with the assumption that the discrete values
were obtained by dividing continuous measurements into bins of width ǫ, and so called the
resulting models “ǫ-machines”. This name is unfortunate: that is usually a bad way of
discretizing data (§1.3.6.4), the quantity ǫ plays no role in the actual theory, and the name
is more than usually impenetrable to outsiders. While I have used it extensively myself, it
should probably be avoided.
13.An alternate definition [10] looks at the entropy rate (§1.7) of the symbol sequences: a
generating partition is one which maximizes the entropy rate, which is the same as maximizing
the extra information about the initial condition x provided by each symbol of the sequence
Φ(x).
14.Quantum versions of CA are an active topic of investigation, but unlikely to be of
biological relevance [246].
15. In a talk at the Santa Fe Institute, summer of 2000; the formula does not seem to have
been published.
16.A simple argument just invokes the central limit theorem. The number of points falling
within the shaded region has a binomial distribution, with success parameter p, so asymp-
totically x/n has a Gaussian distribution with mean p and standard deviation
√
p(1− p)/n.
A non-asymptotic result comes from Chernoff’s inequality [281], which tells us that, for all
n, Pr(|x/n− p| ≥ ǫ) < 2e−2nǫ
2
.
17.The chain needs to be irreducible, meaning one can go from any point to any other
point, and positive recurrent, meaning that there’s a positive probability of returning to any
point infinitely often.
18.Unless our choices for the transition probabilities are fairly perverse, the central limit
theorem still holds, so asymptotically our estimate still has a Gaussian distribution around
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the true value, and still converges as N−1/2 for large enough N , but determining what’s
“large enough” is trickier.
19.An important exception is the case of equilibrium statistical mechanics, where the
dynamics under the Metropolis algorithm are like the real dynamics.
20.For a pedagogical discussion, with examples, of how compression algorithms may be
misused, see http://bactra.org/notebooks/cep-gzip.html.
21.The issue of what language to write the program in is secondary; writing a program
to convert from one language to another just adds on a constant to the length of the over-all
program, and we will shortly see why additive constants are not important here.
22.Very short programs can calculate π to arbitrary accuracy, and the length of these
programs does not grow as the number of digits calculated does. So one could run one of
these programs until it had produced the first two quadrillion digits, and then erase the first
half of the output, and stop.
23. [167] is perhaps the most notorious; see [168] and especially [169] for critiques.
24. It is certainly legitimate to regard any dynamical process as also a computational
process, [284–286, 195], so one could argue that the data is produced by some kind of program.
But even so, this computational process generally does not resemble that of the minimal,
Kolmogorov program at all.
25. It is important to note [185, chapter 3] that if we allowed any possible model in Θ, find
the minimum would, once again, be incomputable. This restriction to a definite, perhaps
hierarchically organized, class of models is vitally important.
26.Take our favorite class of models, and add on deterministic models which produce
particular fixed blocks of data with probability 1. For any of these models θ, L(x, θ) is either
0 (if x is what that model happens to generate) or ∞. Then, once we have our data, and
find a θ which generates that and nothing but that, re-arrange the coding scheme so that
D(θ,Θ) = 1; this is always possible. Thus, CSC(x,Θ) = 1 bit.
27.This does not contradict the convergence result of the last paragraph; one of the not-
too-onerous conditions mentioned in the previous paragraph is that the coding scheme remain
fixed, and we’re violating that.
28.Technically, a given regular language (§1.3.6).
29. If I replace the random data by the exact log-normal probability distribution over the
same range, and do a least-squares fit to that, the R2 actually increases, to 0.994.
30.Profs. Drenzer and Farrell kindly shared their data with me, but the figures and analysis
that follow are my own.
31.Note that the log-normal curve fitted to the whole data continues to match the data
well even in the tail. For further discussion, omitted here for reasons of space, see
http://bactra.org/weblog/232.html.
32. In reading this literature, it may be helpful to bear in mind that by “methodological
individualism”, social scientists mean roughly what biologists do by “reductionism”.
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